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Abstract 
This thesis highlights findings from behavioral economics in the context of real estate markets, 
and the housing market in particular. Behavioral biases such as loss aversion, anchoring, herding, 
investor sentiment, charm pricing and round numbers bias are addressed.  
In the empirical part, the Oslo housing market for freeholder dwellings in the period of 2006 to 
2013 is analyzed. The value evaluations of professional surveyors are found to be good estimates 
of a dwelling’s market worth, however they are lower than final sales prices on average, and 
might not sufficiently incorporate all available information. 
I find widespread clustering of all price measures in the data; value evaluations and final sales 
prices cluster at round numbers, asking prices cluster at charm prices. The role of round numbers 
as focal points is considered, and estimated coefficients show that a million kroner focal point 
attracts 44% more sales than other 50 000kr price points. The relative effects of different focal 
points appear to be stable across time. However, the pull of mass is stronger from above the focal 
point than below, which might be interpreted as a pull from the seller’s side of the distribution. 
Finally, different designs of asking prices are considered. The data reveals that round number 
pricing, and setting the asking price equal to value evaluation are the most favorable designs in 
terms of final sales price. Charm pricing and ”under-pricing” either has no, or a negative effect on 
the final sales price. 
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“Our comforting conviction that the world makes sense rests on a secure foundation: 
Our almost unlimited ability to ignore our ignorance.” 
(Daniel Kahneman, 2011b, p. 201) 
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1 Behavioral Economics in Relation to 
Real Estate Markets 
 
 “Stated otherwise, decision makers can satisfice either by finding optimum solutions for a 
simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more realistic world.” -  Herbert A. 
Simon (1979) 
 
To an economist, the purchase of a house is often framed as a decision to buy the future flow of 
housing service-units the property yields. To the average household, the purchase of a house is 
framed as the decision to buy a home. It might seem like there is a small difference between the 
two perspectives outlined above. Look again. This thesis is constructed to disentangle the 
intricacies of behavioral biases in the housing market. 
A house is not just a utility service provider. It is a place to live, make memories and experience 
life for better and worse. To many people, their home is their anchor in life. One could argue that 
this is just semantics. That comfort and security are just components of the housing utility 
equation. This is where I beg to differ. 
There is in my opinion a fundamental difference between what our theory captures, and the 
processes people actually experience when they are buying/selling a house. The literature of 
economics is good at capturing and quantifying the pure economic incentives in markets. 
However, it is my conjecture that the literature has shortcomings when it comes to capturing and 
quantifying cognitive, emotional, and even moral sentiments that are present in markets. These 
sentiments have an effect on the final economic outcomes, and they can shape markets. To 
disregard and omit such variables in our analysis can be reasonable based on arguments of 
simplicity or tractability. However, the fallacy committed by us as economists is that we interpret 
the omission of such variables to signify their lack of importance. 
When I started out writing this thesis, I set forth to quantify any possible loss aversion in the 
Norwegian housing market. I soon ran into identification issues, as housing prices across the 
country have soared almost uninterrupted ever since the housing crash of 1988. Therefore, I had 
to reconsider my approach and adjust my research inquiry to the current market conditions. 
Which behavioral biases persevere in a booming housing market? 
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The purpose of the first few chapters is to give an overview of some key features of behavioral 
economics. In particular, I will address how these insights are applied to real estate markets. The 
many and non-unified approaches that sets behavioral economics apart from more orthodox 
strands of economics is a double-edged sword. In many ways, it allows researchers to revisit and 
rediscover traditional topics with fresh scrutiny. It also allows for investigation of different and 
new research areas altogether. However, this comes at a cost of a less cohesive theoretical 
framework, which makes dispersed contributions harder to assess in a unified way. In search of a 
“common denominator” to interpret the literature by, we will make use of prospect theory as our 
starting point. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
A short primer of prospect theory is offered in section 1.1, and will act as our theoretical 
reference point throughout the thesis. In turn, I review key research contributions on the topics of 
loss aversion, anchoring, focal points and round numbers, as well as charm pricing. Section 1.4 
provide insights on the nature of expectations, both rational and non-rational. 
Section 2 introduces the dataset used in the empirical analysis of this thesis, and provides some 
summary statistics of typical attributes of the Oslo housing market. 
Section 3 is the empirical part of this thesis and is designed to analyze the interrelations of value 
evaluations, asking prices, and final sales prices. Section 3.1 dissects how surveyors set their 
value evaluations. Section 3.2 raises the question of which listing price design has the most 
favorable effect on final sales price, charm pricing or round number pricing? Section 3.3 looks at 
how sales prices cluster at round numbers, and how focal points attract excess mass of sales. 
Finally, section 4 concludes and summarizes the contributions of this thesis. 
The key learning outcome will be to construct an understanding of how behavioral influences 
might affect both market participants, and market outcomes in the Oslo market for housing. 
1.1 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory (PT) is perhaps the most common departure from one of the central tenets of 
economics, the expected utility theory, henceforth abbreviated EUT (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). PT, as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) will provide a useful 
backdrop for the main part of this thesis. The insights of the theory will help underline the 
importance and wider-reaching consequences that the anomalies and departures from the 
traditional EUT-paradigm can have on markets. 
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As it is neither the intention nor the main purpose of this thesis to give a comprehensive overview 
of the literature pertaining to both expected utility theory and non-expected utility theory I would 
advise the reader to reference “Prospect theory: For risk and ambiguity” (Wakker, 2010) for 
valuable insights. However, to get us off on an equal footing I shall start with an overview of 
Prospect Theory. 
 
 
Figure 1 - (Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) - A Hypothetical Value Function 
The Figure 1 shows the graphic representation of a so-called value-function, which is central to 
Prospect Theory. The distinct S-like shape implies that the value function is convex over the 
domain of losses, and concave over the domains of gains. Hence, the theory suggests that people 
may act risk-seeking when facing losses, and risk-averse when facing gains. The breakpoint 
centered at the origin is due to the incorporation of a reference point in Prospect Theory. As 
opposed to EUT, which assumes that final states of wealth are the key carriers of utility, PT 
ascribes losses and gains relative to a reference point to be the carriers of utility. The breakpoint 
is incorporated in PT to account for the common findings in experimental economics that 
“...losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 279). 
This discontinuity implies that agents suffer from loss aversion and that inertia is frequently 
assessed as a favorable option. A larger gain is needed to outweigh the disutility of a set amount 
of loss; therefore, the theory predicts that agents will be reluctant to realize losses. If the option is 
between action A, which is uncertain to bring either a loss or an equivalent gain, and action B 
which is to do nothing, then action B is the favored option. This favors the status-quo and 
contributes to inertia. 
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Figure 2 - (Fennema and Wakker 1997) - An Example of a Hypothetical Decision-Weight Function in Cumulative 
Prospect Theory 
The concept of decision-weights are integral in the construction of PT. Decision-weights are 
allowed to be subjective and are susceptible to modification through the coding process. In EUT 
the decision weight is the actual stated probability, which is plotted as the 45°-degree line in 
Figure 2. Therefore, one can argue as Fennema and Wakker (1997) that CPT is a generalization 
of expected utility, as the theory allows for probabilities to be 1:1 with decision-weights, as well 
as allowing for decision-weights to diverge from probabilities. 
In the coding and editing phase, which occurs before any decision is made, the agent interprets 
the available prospects with the help of heuristics. Some of these heuristics leads to consistent 
violations of EUT. However, since PT is a positive rather than normative theory, this is regarded 
as one of the strong points of the theory. Namely, to explain how and when we can expect 
violations of EUT, and therefore prescribe measures to guard against such biases that these 
heuristic decision-rules may lead to. 
The coding and editing process is a personal application of a variety of heuristics and cognitive 
“short-cuts” of sorts that enables the agent to make complicated decisions in the matter of 
seconds. The process is in essence when you simplify the decision-making by rounding 
probabilities, discarding components shared by all the prospects, combining probabilities 
associated with identical outcomes, segregate riskless components, scanning for dominance and 
discarding extremely unlikely outcomes. This differs greatly from EUT in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the process is allowed to be subjective, which is not the case in EUT. In EUT, two agents 
with the same information and preferences are to reach the same conclusion by calculating the 
highest expected value of a prospect. Through coding and editing, PT describes the many 
possible combinations of different heuristics that enables decision-makers to perceive prospects 
differently. The personal perception of a prospect can differ even when two decision-makers are 
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facing the same information and have the same preferences. Secondly, the alteration and 
modification of probabilities, like rounding probabilities or discarding unlikely outcomes, is 
something that violates the normative calculations of EUT. The decision-rules are employed to 
make calculations easier and quicker, thus alleviating some of the computational constraints 
posed on decision-makers. These simplifications sometimes come at a great cost however, as they 
only give reasonable approximations most of the time. Accuracy is traded for expediency when 
faced by time- and computational constraints.  
In this way, the coding and editing phase is what gives rise to a number of anomalies and biases 
that will be discussed more in-depth later in this thesis. For now, it suffices to note that coding 
and editing is a vital part of PT, and one of the main differences that sets it apart from EUT. 
Again, a caution is warranted as the process is not uniquely identified in all cases, i.e. two 
different people may code and edit prospects differently. This is by some seen as a weakness of 
the theory, that it lacks the predictive and normative power that we are accustomed to with EUT. 
For others it signifies a broader perspective and a less restrictive way of theorizing around 
processes such as decision-making. PT arguably offers something different from EUT, and 
emphasizes the descriptive side of actual behavior. 
Another important psychological concept is included in PT, and that is the concept of diminishing 
sensitivity. In PT, a gain from $110 to $120 has less impact than a gain from $10 to $20, due to 
the diminishing sensitivity to absolute values. Parallels can be drawn to the diminishing marginal 
gain from standard utility-functions. In PT however, as noted previously, the value function is 
concave over gains and convex in the domain of losses, both expressing diminishing sensitivity 
as we move further away from the reference point. Furthermore, PT is distinguished by the 
feature of diminishing sensitivity as it also applies to the weighting function itself. That is, there 
is diminishing sensitivity to probability changes. 
Within prospect theory, the experimental findings suggest that both particularly small and large 
probabilities often are susceptible to over-weighting. If we think of probabilities as having two 
very salient endpoints, namely 0 and 1, those values are frequently found to be invoked as 
reference points. This means that there is overemphasis and strong sensitivity to probabilities near 
the endpoints of the scale, that is 0 and 1, as this is very close to the reference point. The 
probabilities in the mid-range of a probability distribution are relatively insensitive to changes 
when applied in decision weights, as the impact of their change will be relatively small. As the 
mid-range values are far from either reference point, they exhibit diminishing sensitivity within 
the context of prospect theory. This yields the characteristic inverse S-shape of the Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT) weighting function, as shown before in Figure 2. Note that CPT has some 
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departures from PT, but to us the most notable difference is that PT violates the principle of 
stochastic dominance and CPT does not, due to the way decision weights are constructed. 
Lastly, there is a need for some words of caution. PT was developed to account for a series of 
experiments and findings that showed patterns of inconsistencies with EUT. As experiments are 
mostly conducted in highly stylized settings and controlled environments, that is the very context 
in which prospect theory is most suitable. Particularly, all experiments had clearly defined 
options and explicitly stated probabilities. Those requirements are often not met in the real world. 
Ever since its inception, prospect theory has inspired an ever-expanding field of research. This 
has led to the application and use of prospect theory in settings that are far-removed from the 
foundations on which it was built. For instance in a market context, it is difficult to map all 
possible options and choices, and even more difficult to clearly define the probabilities that are 
ascribed to each choice. What constitutes a reference point is also a key question. Is it the status 
quo, or the expected outcome or something entirely else? Another point to be made is that 
prospect theory describes individual choice. There are, as to my knowledge, no definitive 
guidelines as to how to apply it in the aggregate. The most common approach seems to sidestep 
this problem and assume linear aggregation, thus assuming every individual makes the same 
decision. As previously described, the coding and editing process is innately subjective and can 
differ between people. Therefore this issue still remains unresolved in a satisfactory manner. 
These are examples of methodological concerns that need careful attention, and as we proceed, an 
effort is made to highlight these issues. Naturally, when inserting prospect theory into a 
completely new setting, and applying it as theoretical foundation for explanatory factors in 
observed outcomes, caution and comment is warranted.  
Daniel Levy (1992) is an apt example on how to apply Prospect Theory in a new context. His 
research shows the promise of prospect theory within other fields than economics, by applying it 
to international relations. Careful consideration is applied to the methodological difficulties that 
arise from this exercise, and he argues that empirical evidence that is congruent with the 
predictions of prospect theory is not enough to validate its use. Levy argues that there is a 
necessity to compare findings to a rational choice model, and that prospect theory needs to 
validate itself as a comparatively better fit to empirical data. That exercise is a stringent, but not 
unambiguous requirement.  
N. C. Barberis (2013, p. 179) highlights a more pluralistic stance in his review that 
commemorates 30 years of prospect theory in economics. It is not a question whether we should 
replace traditional models with prospect theory, but how we can gain from implementing both 
types of models, that should be of interest to our discipline. 
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1.2 Loss aversion 
As underlined in chapter 1, loss aversion is essentially the observed behavior that people require a 
disproportionate large gain to offset a loss. In contrast to expected utility theory this implies that 
if you initially have $200, and then lose $100, only to recuperate the $100 dollars again later, then 
you are not back to where you started. This is contingent on the reference point shifting from 
$200 to $100 in the process. The loss of $100 weighs more heavily on you than the equivalent 
sized gain of $100. To build intuition we might consider it analogous (but in no way identical) to 
loosing 50% of your wealth, only to immediately be followed by a 50% gain. If your initial 
wealth was $200, then after losing and re-gaining 50%, you now only hold $150 in wealth. When 
carriers of utility are gains and losses, then reference-dependence and loss aversion are likely to 
impact decision-making.  
“Reference-dependence and loss aversion help account for several phenomena of choice. The 
familiar observation that out-of-pocket losses are valued much more than opportunity costs is 
readily explained, if these outcomes are evaluated on different limbs of the value function. (D. 
Kahneman, 2003, p. 1457) 
The quote above illustrates yet again the departure from standard economic reasoning that all 
economic factors are to be valued according to their alternative best use, e.g. the opportunity cost. 
It is the kink of the prospect theory value function at the reference point, which accounts for the 
over-weighting of losses compared to gains. If an opportunity cost is, as Kahneman suggests, 
perceived as a foregone gain, and an out-of-pocket loss is evaluated as a true loss, then according 
to prospect theory we would pay less attention to the opportunity cost, and strongly focus on out-
of-pocket losses. This does not fit in with standard economic assumptions, but it is often 
recognized in law, where reparations and compensation makes a clear distinction between actual 
incurred losses and opportunity costs (Cohen & Knetsch, 1992). 
In general, there has been extensive research on loss aversion across a various field of markets, 
experimental settings and in different disciplines, spanning more than 30 years of research. 
Behavior that is consistent with loss aversion has been discovered in everything from trading of 
college basketball tickets to orange juice purchases and its occurrence seems ubiquitous, see 
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) for a brief historical overview. Kahneman and Tversky are the 
central contributors to the field and responsible for introducing and coining the term loss aversion 
(See their defining papers; (1979);(1991);(1992)). In 2002, the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, 
together with experimental economist Vernon L. Smith, received the memorial Nobel Prize in 
economic sciences. As motivation for the award, the committee emphasized Kahneman’s 
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contribution through his work on integrating psychological factors in the domain of economic 
activities. This was partly in recognition of the importance, and the growing influence of concepts 
such as loss aversion and anchoring.  
Together with Richard Thaler and Jack Knetch , D. Kahneman (1991) made use of  experiments 
to analyse the empirical grounds of loss aversion as a regular occurrence in economic activities. 
Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler (1993) used loss aversion to offer an explanation of Mehra 
and Prescott’s (1985)  equity premium  puzzle, the idea being that loss-averse investors forego 
long-run gains because of a combination of their myopia and loss aversion. In a more recent 
paper Banerji and Gupta (2014) use a novel auction design to elicit and identify the magnitude of 
loss aversion in auctions. They offer a design that can mitigate bias in the standard Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak mechanism that arises when dealing with loss-averse participants. In addition, 
the increasing focus on the burgeoning field of neuro-economics has led to an appreciation of the 
cognitive side of economic theory. In an effort to build a nexus between insights from behavioral 
economics and neurological science, it was shown that loss aversion can be attributed to activity 
increases and decreases, in particular brain-regions (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). 
These are all examples of the variety and plethora of research on loss aversion. In the following, I 
will emphasize loss aversion in the real-estate markets, and the effects it can have on the 
aggregate outcome. A sub-categorization of loss aversion is found in Appendix A to gain a better 
understanding of the concept as a whole. There I evaluate money illusion as well as the 
disposition effect and the endowment effect, whilst showing their connections to loss aversion. 
1.2.1 Loss aversion in Real Estate Markets 
A number of researchers report evidence of loss aversion (Anenberg, 2011; Bokhari & Geltner, 
2011; Einiö, Kaustia, & Puttonen, 2008; Engelhardt, 2003; Genesove & Mayer, 2001; Stephens 
& Tyran, 2012). The combination of  prospect theory and real estate markets was brought 
forward by Genesove and Mayer’s paper (2001), where they estimated the impact of loss 
aversion in the Boston condominium market. They found a significant effect of nominal loss 
aversion, while controlling for liquidity constraints. The sellers, who were facing a nominal loss 
in the market, set a higher asking price than sellers not subjected to a prospective loss. This 
would suggests that path-dependency matters (David, 2007), and that sunk-costs are treated as a 
normal cost. 
While the excess asking prices may be caused by behavioral influences, the trade-off the sellers 
make is to face a longer time on the market, which can be fully explained by rational choice 
theory. However, the loss-averse sellers also receive part of that excess asking-price when selling, 
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indicating that the market actually responds to their bias. In the words of the authors:  “Thus the 
high asking-prices set by those with a potential loss are not simply brief and irrational “wish” 
statements that the market quickly corrects” (Genesove & Mayer, 2001, p. 1236). 
I will elaborate on this point in the section 1.6 regarding markets, experience and how to mitigate 
behavioral biases. For now we note that loss aversion can occur in functional markets, and move 
on to take a closer look on the distinction between liquidity effects and loss aversion in the 
housing market. 
Genesove and Mayer’s analysis was offered as an explanation of the positive correlation between 
price and volume observed in most real estate markets (Jim Clayton, Miller, & Peng, 2010). Ever 
since Stein (1995) proposed his housing model with down-payment constraints, there has been 
competing explanations for the positive price-volume correlation found in the data. The question 
has been whether the analyses are measuring the down payment/liquidity-constraint or a factor of 
loss aversion. As G&M’s 2001-paper is a follow up to their work on liquidity constraints in 1997 
(Genesove & Mayer, 1997), the latest paper explicitly addresses this issue, and concludes that 
their previous estimates of liquidity-constraints effect on prices are halved when including loss 
aversion in the regression (Genesove & Mayer, 2001).  
However, a word of caution is warranted here, as their latter paper uses an extended dataset the 
regression-coefficients are not directly comparable. Even so, Genesove and Mayer conclude that 
their first analysis greatly overestimated the impact of liquidity constraints due to omitted 
variable bias. 
Chan (2001), Engelhardt (2003) and Anenberg (2011) find similar evidence of loss aversion in a 
variety of real-estate markets across the U.S. In summary, it is a strong indication of loss aversion 
in housing markets that is robust across dimensions of time and space. The effect in the 
marketplace stemming from loss aversion varies across the literature. Engelhardt (2003) finds 
that a 5% nominal loss is associated with a 30-44% reduction in the probability to move. In Einiö 
et al. (2008) they find that losses are much less frequently realized than gains in the Helsinki 
housing market, while controlling for the relative possibility of incurring a loss or gain. Lastly, in 
the most recent paper (Bokhari & Geltner, 2011) they find that sellers facing a loss, relative to 
their prior purchase price, set an asking price which is higher than those not facing a loss by a 
magnitude of 38% of their loss exposure. This leads to a final sales price, which is higher than if 
they were not facing a loss by the magnitude of 24.5% of their loss exposure. These findings are 
of approximately the same magnitude as Genesove and Mayer’s (2001) estimates; Asking prices 
were found to be higher for sellers facing a loss, at a magnitude of 25% to 35% of the loss 
exposure, and the final sales price was also higher than if the seller was not facing a loss, 
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measured to 3-18% of the loss exposure. To put it plainly: a seller facing a $100 000 loss is likely 
to set an asking price which is from $25 000 to $38 000 higher, and receive a sales price which is 
between $3 000 to $24 500 higher than if he was not facing a loss. 
1.3 The Behavioral Influence of Prices 
In undergraduate economics we are taught that prices are signals, which incorporate a lot of 
information in a very efficient and expedient way. In fact, this is often celebrated as one of the 
great achievements of markets. The call for legalization of prediction markets, which can process 
uncertain information in a systematic way, made by a series of Nobel laureates and prominent 
scholars can stand as an example of that (Arrow et al., 2007). However, the perception, 
interpretation and processing of prices may vary between different populations, and even change 
across time within subjects. This is a less commonly emphasized feature of prices, which has 
gained much more attention within the field of behavioral economics. This section tries to assess 
a few key points that might affect the price setting and strategies in the housing markets. 
Mental accounting, as defined by Richard H. Thaler (1999, p. 183) is: “.. the set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial 
activities.”.  
It perhaps sounds like something that is unconditionally a good thing. However, this special type 
of “mental arithmetic” tends to violate the assumption that final states of wealth are the carriers of 
utility, and leads to a breakdown in the fungibility of funds. Non-fungibility means that money 
allotted to one specific purchase is no longer a perfect substitute for another purchase. An oft 
mentioned example of this is the concept of “house money” found amongst gamblers. The money 
that is won at the casino are treated different, perhaps spent in a more cavalier way than the 
money they brought into the casino. 
Seiler, Seiler, and Lane (2012) find strong indications of mental accounting in their survey 
experiment pertaining to real estate markets. This, they find, is coupled with false-reference 
points, which concurrently affect the decision-maker. Most of the participants in their study make 
use of the break-even point as a false reference point. It is false in the sense that a rational 
decision-maker knows that the past purchase price is a sunk cost, and thus it should not matter for 
the decision to hold or sell. 
Thaler himself intimately links the development of the mental accounting theory to that of 
prospect theory (R. H. Thaler, 1999). In the widest sense of the words, mental accounting 
encompasses all of the coding and editing process found in prospect theory, as well as related 
concepts such as framing and the evaluation of events. Mental accounting adopts the value 
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function found in prospect theory and thus includes the features of a reference point and loss 
aversion.   
An instructive example of mental accounting comes from A. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
where it is found that people tend to be willing to incur a given transaction cost when the 
prospective saving is large in terms of percentage of the good, however they are not willing to 
incur the cost when the prospective saving is low, measured in percentage of the good in 
question. 
“Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for ($125)[$15] and a calculator for 
($15)[$125]. The calculator salesman informs you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale 
for ($10)[$120] at the other branch of the store, located 20 minutes drive away. Would you make 
the trip to the other store?” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 459) 
It is found that most people would like to save five dollars on the calculator, but not the jacket. 
1.3.1 Anchoring  
“Highly accessible values are generally overweighted, and when considered as possible answers 
to a question they become potent anchors” – Daniel Kahneman (2002, p.482) 
Ever since Northcraft and Neale (1987) there has been considerable interest in anchoring and 
adjustment processes in real estate in particular. They devised a quite intuitive and appealing 
study in which both students and professional realtors were presented a property to assess. The 
subjects were all taken on-site to actually see the house in question and received an information 
package akin to the usual information supplied by a real estate agent. The treatment variable they 
provided was an asking price, which they varied throughout the study. This asking price turned 
out to be a salient anchor, which influenced both the professionals’ and students’ estimate of the 
market worth. 
The asking price varied from +-4% to +-12% above and below the actual assessed price, as given 
by a professional surveyor. Anchors of this kind are likely to have an impact on inexperienced 
participants (students), but should (in theory) not affect the professionals when determining the 
value of the house. Northcraft & Neale interpret their findings as compelling evidence that 
realtors indeed were affected by the given listing price. The realtors’ predictions were biased 
upwards when given a high initial estimate. Correspondingly, their assessments were biased 
downwards when given a low initial estimate. 
In the ensuing questionnaire survey of the participants, both students and professionals reported 
that they made use of comparison computations involving neighborhood characteristics and past 
transactions, as well as the listing price. However, the experts were much less likely to report the 
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listing price as one of their three most decisive factors. It seems as both groups were unaware that 
the potent anchor might bias their estimates, and that this contributes to the insufficient 
adjustment away from it. 
As Northcraft and Neale (1987, p.95) concludes: “It remains an open question whether experts’ 
denial of the use of listing price as a consideration in valuing property reflects a lack of 
awareness of their use of listing price as a consideration, or simply an unwillingness to 
acknowledge publicly their dependence on an admittedly inappropriate piece of information.” 
At the very least, this finding should advise us to allow for the possibility that anchors might 
affect the decision making process in the housing market. 
1.3.2 Focal-Points / Round Numbers 
 “The effects of salience and anchoring play a central role in treatments of judgment and choice. 
Indeed, anchoring effects are among the most robust phenomena of judgment, and overweighting 
of salient values is likely to be the mechanism that explains why low-probability events sometimes 
loom large in decision making”  - Daniel Kahneman (2002, p. 482) 
Although related to anchoring, focal points and round numbers are more specific in the way that 
they only relate to a few select values in the housing price distribution. Specifically, an integer 
followed by a string of 0’s is conceptualized to constitute a round number, e.g. $50 000 or 
$300 000, etc. This particular design of price might evoke special cognitive processes within the 
buyer. 
The concept of focal points in bargaining processes is attributed to Thomas Schelling by Pope, 
Pope, and Sydnor (2014), which allows for a more diverse bargaining process than what is found 
within the standard axiomatic approach put forward by Nash. The Nash approach requires 
symmetry; essentially that both parties have rational expectations and follow the same rules of 
behavior. In Schelling’s framework focal points may represent common thresholds that help 
bargainers meet at certain levels. In this way, focal points can help avoid bargaining impasse, and 
speed up the bargaining process as the increments of the bargaining offers are large. As the 
empirical analysis in section 3.3 closely follows the approach of Pope, Pope and Sydnor, I will 
interpret the round numbers pricing as focal points, and the two terms are used interchangeably.  
Let us now focus on some reports of round numbers in the literature. In a worldwide review of 
consumer surveys from 38 countries Curtin (2007) examines more than 52.000 cases of 
probability-questions from University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment surveys in the period 
1998-2006. He finds that there is a strong occurrence of incomplete use of the whole range of the 
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probability scale, by the respondents. That is, respondents only tend to use a few salient numbers 
in their answers to questions regarding probability, and not the whole range of the scale.  
For instance, when asked: “Personal income will increase during next twelve months”, 
respondents reported full certainty (either “0%” as answer or “100%” as answer) in 32% of the 
cases. Quarter rounding, that is a response of either 25%, 50% or 75%, was the answer of 20% of 
the subjects. The use of “ten-rounding numbers”, that is 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80, 90, were 
replied by 38% of the subjects. 
“Why did the vast majority of respondents choose so few points out of the range from 0 to 100? 
The most common answer is that the responses represent "rounded" estimates.” (Curtin, 2007, p. 
24) 
Together, those salient numbers constitute only 13/100 of the possible range of a probability 
distribution. In the aggregate, those 13 values account for 90% of the cumulative probability 
reported by the 26101 cases in the sample from 2002-2006. This can be interpreted as a round 
numbers bias and a reliance of salient numbers.  
In the literature, it is not given that this kind of rounding is the effect of a behavioral bias. It 
might be that the coarseness of the estimates that are provided, represent the trade-off between 
cognitive strain and response-time. This has been proposed as an explanation, namely that people 
round off their estimates and responses, as a matter of convenience. This is what I will refer to as 
the convenience-rounding heuristic. However, the potential scope of such an explanation is 
limited, as it should not affect high stakes decision-making, where outcomes are greatly affected 
by this kind of rounding. It is my contention that the housing market is exactly this type of high-
stakes environment. A plausible framework for interpretation of this type of behavior is that of 
Herbert A. Simons “bounded rationality” (1955). In Simon’s theory, agents are satisficers who 
balance the computational costs of a given problem with the limited cognitive resources of the 
human mind. Thus, the notion is that people simplify and round of estimates, as it reduced 
computational demands.  
Palmon, Smith, and Sopranzetti (2004) find that dwellings where the asking price is on a round 
number, sell both faster and for higher sales prices as compared to those that were listed with an 
asking price at a just-below round number (commonly interpreted as a charm price). However, as 
discussed in the subsequent section, the empirical results found in the literature are conflicting 
when it comes to which pricing strategy results in the highest final sales price; round numbers or 
charm pricing. Palmon, Smith and Sopranzetti focus on the precision of the asking price, and 
other papers have shown that a more precise asking price may signal that the seller has superior 
knowledge of his dwelling’s worth, and that it leads to better bargaining outcomes (Beracha & 
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Seiler, 2014; Mason, Lee, Wiley, & Ames, 2013; Thomas, Simon, & Kadiyali, 2010). The section 
below addresses charm pricing explicitly, but round numbers- and charm pricing usually both 
occur simultaneously for different dwellings in housing markets. Their effects relative to one 
another are still debatable though, as they both claim to have a positive effect on sales price. 
1.3.3 Charm Pricing / “Just-Below Pricing” 
Allen and Dare (2004) analyze the design of listing prices in the market for single family houses 
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida over the years 2000 and 2001. They find that properties where the 
asking price was a charm-price (examples are prices ending in $900, $4,900 or $9,900), sold for 
significantly more than those who did not have a charm listing price. The analysis controlled for a 
number of dwelling characteristics, instrumented effects of time-on-market, and selectivity bias. 
As a robustness check, they found that houses that were listed with a round number asking price 
(e.g. ending in multiples of $10,000’s or $100,000’s) sold for significantly less. 
In a controlled experiment approach Cardella and Seiler (2014) find that the precision of the 
listing price, meaning that the price is not rounded and not a charm-price (e.g. $287,455), affects 
the final sales price in a positive way. When looking at just below round numbers (charm-prices), 
they find that it yields the largest percentage difference between list price and final sale price, as 
well as yielding consistently low counter offers from the seller. They also argue that the different 
listing price strategies affect both the buyers’ and the sellers’ negotiation processes in different 
ways. This might indicate that the bargaining process is complex, and potentially not adequately 
described in conventional theory.  
Bucchianeri and Minson (2013) find that anchoring was evident in three northeastern states of the 
U.S. over the course of 2005-2009.Relatively higher listing prices was found to lead to higher 
selling prices. Furthermore, underpricing/charm pricing lead to less favorable outcomes for the 
dwellings employing that type of listing price strategy. In a recent empirical analysis,Beracha and 
Seiler (2014) find that “just-below” pricing relates to shorter time on the market and higher 
transaction prices than precise and round number pricing in Virginia. 
In rational search models it has often been assumed that the asking price is the willingness to 
accept. Therefore buyers are modeled as never having to paying more than the asking price, as 
any offer at the asking price will be accepted, see Arnold (1999) for an example of such a 
theoretical search model of the housing market. As chapter 2 of this thesis explicitly shows, this 
assumption is routinely violated as dwellings sell for more than the asking price. Thus, equating 
the asking price with the willingness-to-accept in the Norwegian market will yield improbable 
theoretical predictions. 
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Charm pricing can be seen in relation to the left digit bias found in psychological and marketing 
theory (Coulter, 2001). It has been hypothesized that the cognitive processes are biased towards 
only remembering the leftmost digits. Thus, charm pricing can be seen as an attempt to exploit 
this behavioral heuristic, however the effects of this listing price design remain an empirical 
issue, as the findings in the literature thus far are conflicting. 
1.4 Price Expectations – Rational? 
In the behavioral finance textbook  by Ackert and Deaves (2010, p. 67) we find 3 requirements 
for market efficiency: 
1) All investors are all rational 
2) Investor errors are uncorrelated 
3) There are no limits to arbitrage 
In the housing market, and perhaps in real estate more in general, all these three foundations of 
market efficiency can be called into question. For instance, herding behavior (as analyzed in 
section 1.4) can be an example of a violation of req. 1) and 2) as investors overshoot from 
fundamental values and tend to follow market sentiments (Hott, 2012). There are also evident 
limits to arbitrage in real-estate markets, as we cannot short-sell houses, and transaction costs are 
large both in terms of search costs and brokerage fees. However, even if some of these three 
requirements are not met, Ackert and Deaves argue that market efficiency will be restored as long 
as at least one of the criteria holds. The most debated criteria is perhaps the assumption of perfect 
rationality. This section therefore looks deeper into questions about rationality, and more 
specifically; whether expectations are rational or not. 
Over the course of a business-cycle the housing and real estate markets tend to fluctuate. Most of 
these price movements can be explained by changes in fundamentals such as, after-tax real cost 
of borrowing, GDP growth rates, demographic trends, construction costs and supply of new 
housing units. However, there is growing evidence that housing markets are not efficient, and to 
some extent predictable (K. E. Case & Shiller, 1990; Larsen & Weum, 2008). Expectations that 
violate rational assumptions has been offered as an explanation for this inefficiency in the 
housing market, and could potentially explain the excess returns that are observed (Jim Clayton, 
1996; Shiller, 1990).   
An example of the contrasting approaches to model housing markets in either rational or non-
rational terms comes from Wheaton (1999). He builds a stock-flow model of the real-estate 
market and shows how myopic agents tend to generate cycles in the market as they make use of 
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extrapolation of current rates to determine their investment decisions. He also shows that for the 
same model, now assuming rational expectations, the only way to generate cycles is for the 
economy to be hit by alternating exogenous shocks. The fully rational agents can predict the 
changes that are induced from each and every shock and adjust accordingly, but they do not know 
the timing of the shocks. In this way, the observed cycles in the housing market are “rationalized” 
such that the rational expectations assumption still holds and is compatible with observed facts. 
Capozza et. al (2002) find evidence of strong auto-correlation and mean-reversion of real house 
prices across the board of major U.S. metropolitan areas. Their findings suggest that prices are 
slow to react to exogenous shocks, and prices are sticky. The authors highlight the difficulties of 
reconciling rational expectations with these empirical findings:  
“From a theoretical perspective in which forward-looking prices should immediately incorporate 
all available information about future changes in real houseprices, the impact of factors affecting 
serial correlation is difficult to explain.” (Capozza et al., 2002, p. 23). 
In a rational expectations framework, expectations are to be forward-looking, however findings 
like Capozza et al. contradict this. Hattapoglu and Hoxha (2014) also find that households’ 
expectations about future price appreciation is backwards-looking, but at the same time 
fundamental factors such as location influence them. Thus, households are perhaps best described 
as having a hybrid form of both rational and adaptive expectations at the same time. It is 
established that housing markets are inefficient, and as many before them, the authors suggest 
that the limited possibility of arbitrage in the housing market to some extent can be offered as an 
explanation.  
Still, arbitrage in some sense is possible, for instance K. E. Case, Shiller, and Weiss (1993) 
propose a futures market for real estate and home equity insurance which would facilitate this. 
There is no explanation offered by Capozza et al. (2002), or in other studies of my knowledge, of 
why such arbitrage does not materialize quicker in the markets. If arbitrage can be made possible, 
and prices are predictable then “smart-money managers” should take advantage of this 
(Schindler, 2013). However, this seems not to be the case, and is still somewhat of a puzzle. 
There is in a sense, a void left to fill to make the theory add up to the empirics. 
1.4.1 A Rational Framework - The User Cost Model 
In the most basic sense, the user cost of capital framework treats the rental market as a perfect 
substitute for owner-occupied housing. The only decision to make is whether to buy or rent in 
this model. To consider opportunity-costs is the baseline of most rational models, and it holds 
true for this setting as well. Therefore, the rental price of a dwelling can be made use of as a 
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baseline to calculate what the same dwelling is worth in the owner-occupied market. The basic 
relationship is that the ratio of buying-price/rental-price must equate to the inverse of the user 
cost of capital (Himmelberg, Mayer, & Sinai, 2005). However, the compatibility of rental 
dwellings as substitutes for owner-occupied housing is a debatable issue, see Borgersen and 
Sommervoll (2012). 
The user cost of capital is a composite measure of the imputed rents from the dwelling. It is 
essentially an attempt to quantify what the owners would pay themselves if they had to rent their 
own dwelling. It is made up by foregone investment gains(opportunity cost), housing tax 
liabilities, mortgage rate subsidies, depreciation of housing quality, house price expectations 
(capital gains) and a risk premium from owning undiversifiable risk (Himmelberg et al., 2005). 
Browne, Conefrey, and Kennedy (2013) look into the case of Ireland over the past three decades 
and employ the traditional user cost of housing framework to analyze house price dynamics. The 
conclusion thus far for Ireland is that the expected capital gains (house price appreciation) over 
large periods of time made the user cost of capital for housing negative. This means in principle 
that home-owners were not paying for their housing services, rather to the contrary; they gained 
from owning relative to those who rented. One can argue that part of this gain comes in the form 
of a subsidy from tax-payers, since housing related mortgage costs are tax-deductible (Poterba, 
1984). As the authors note, it is a theoretical conundrum that a price in a functioning market can 
be negative, and in the Irish case it led to a vicious boom- and bust-cycle of unprecedented 
proportions. 
“…the idea of a negative price prevailing in unconstrained private markets would seem to 
infringe a basic axiom of economics. It also suggests that, in equilibrium, private market rents 
should, according to our mode of tenure arbitrage story, also be negative which is never 
observed.”(Browne et al., 2013, p. 15) 
The authors indicate that it is the expected house price appreciation that drives most of the user 
cost of capital to be negative. Interest rates and taxation effects are shown to be of secondary 
importance when it comes to explaining the observed outcomes. The above quote aptly illustrates 
the problem the user cost model sometimes face when forced to explain empirically observed 
outcomes. When house prices are positive, and rental prices are positive, then the user cost of 
housing cannot be negative as it is described mathematically in the theory. However, that is what 
has been observed empirically. 
Therefore, at least two possibilities emerge; 1) either the measures that goes into calculating the 
user cost of housing is wrong or 2) the mathematical relation between housing prices, rental 
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prices and user cost of housing is wrong. Option 2 is to the observant reader, of course a 
euphemism for saying that the rational framework of the user cost of housing model is 
conceptually flawed and erroneous. 
“.. if the expected capital gain is high enough, the user cost can be negative, implying that 
expected price appreciation outstrips the cost of capital. If that were the case, the return on home 
buying would be infinite and the user cost would be undefined.” (Mayer & Sinai, 2007, p. 271) 
This issue is something that has been noted in the literature, but dismissed and thus never 
properly been addressed. 
Beatty, Larsen, and Sommervoll (2010) argue that the user cost of housing confuses consumption 
prices with investment gains, it yields a negative user cost in times of rapidly appreciating house 
prices. This will theoretically imply infinite demand for owner-occupied housing, and rental 
prices should then also go into the negative range. 
Interestingly, at the time of writing the user cost of housing in Norway will, by a reasonable set of 
parameter-values, yield a negative user cost. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a 
fully-fledged user cost analysis, but a back-of-the-envelope calculation is offered as an 
illustration in Appendix B.     
The arithmetic show an example of the crucial role the expectations-component plays in the user-
cost of housing framework. In a low interest-rate environment the expected future price 
dominates the equation, and gives a strong incentive to buy rather than to rent. In this sense, it 
can contribute to self-fulfilling prophecies in the housing market. 
1.4.2 The Non-Rational Framework - Market Sentiment 
To contrast the user cost model of housing, I have found it instructive to look towards behavioral 
finance and a theory of market sentiment. In the Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny model I will discuss, 
market sentiment is interpreted as the over- or under-reaction to information. 
N. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) built a parsimonious model that can explain the 
empirically observed over- and underreaction in securities markets. Their motivation was to 
incorporate psychological factors into the market, which then could be used to explain departures 
from the efficient market hypothesis. Their model tries to formalize two key findings in 
psychological research; conservatism and the representativeness heuristic. The meaning of 
conservatism in the form proposed by the authors, is that people react slowly to news that are 
contrarian to their beliefs. People adjust their beliefs, but the magnitude of change is less than 
what fully rational agents would do. This concept thus has clear similarities to anchoring, which 
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was described in subchapter 1.3.1. Conservatism is the theoretical foundation on which 
underreaction is based, and it is described as having a short time span of less than a year. In the 
real estate market, this could suggest that prices are sticky and only slowly adjust to changing 
fundamentals. 
The representativeness heuristic stems from the research of Amos Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), and in principle states that people make use of similarity and familiarity when asked to 
make probability assessments. How representative someone or something is of the population in 
question tends to outweigh proper statistical reasoning criteria such as assessing base-rates. This 
concept is evoked to motivate the inclusion of overreaction in the model of Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny. The intuition is that if a piece of news fits in well with the overall sentiment in the 
market, then representativeness kicks in and further drives the market away from fundamentals. 
Overreaction is based on a string of good news, and is of a longer time perspective than 
underreaction, about 3-5 years. 
Shleifer, Vishny and Gennaioli forthcoming (Gennaioli, Shleifer, & Vishny) offer a 
complementary analysis to the previous model of investor sentiment. They construct a 
rudimentary model based on psychological theory and representativeness that can explain why 
risks of a crash are underweighted in boom-periods, leading to consequent crashes and financial 
crisis. This can be thought of as an extension of the previous model, and incorporates other 
behavioral features that are related to prospect theory through the under/over-weighting of 
probabilities which is a key feature of the coding and editing process.  
Baker and Wurgler (2007) concluded already in 2007 that the debate about whether sentiment 
affects investments or not was over. Sentiment leads to mispricing was the answer, at least for the 
stock market. If we are inclined to believe that the limits to arbitrage, high transaction costs and 
financial nature of real estate transactions only serves to further exacerbate the effects of 
sentiments in the marketplace, then the debate can be put to rest at once. However, let us look at 
some of the indications of sentiment in real estate markets in the U.S. and in Norway. 
1.4.3  Sentiment in the U.S. Real Estate Markets 
Case and Shiller (1988)  find using survey data, that in the U.S. in 1988 there was strong 
indications that home buyers exhibited backwards-looking rather than forward looking 
expectations. In boom markets, respondents had much higher expectations of future price 
increases. The authors strongly conjectured that the housing market has tendencies of booms 
being fueled by expectations, and that these are formed socially and not rationally or based on 
fundamentals. There was downward rigidity in pricing of houses amongst the respondents, and a 
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upward volatility in prices. Lastly, they found that one of the most common influences amongst 
buyers was investment motives. 
In a follow-up study conducted in 2012, over a long sample of surveys spanning 2003-2012, the 
authors found that home buyers were rational, and actually underreacting, in their short-term (1 
year) expectations of the housing market. However, the 10 year expectations seemed to be 
backwards-looking and overreacting, which was a point the authors argued for, but could not 
verify at the time (K. E. Case, Shiller, & Thompson, 2012). Now that we can compare in 
hindsight, it looks as if they were correct.  
For example, in Boston in 2003 they expected an 8,9% increase on average per year for each and 
every year until 2013. The actual price development was only a meagre 0,47% increase on 
average per year, calculated using S&P/Case-Shiller MA-Boston Home Price Index© from the 
FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015). This yields an overestimation of 
8,43% per year.  
That is, respondents expected the house prices to increase 8,43% each and every year for 10 years 
in excess of the actual observed price development. Similar results can be shown for the other 
metropolitan areas included in the Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012) study. The numbers are 
perhaps largely a reflection of the fact that prices were increasing rapidly in the period 2003-
2005, but had a huge downturn, and only now as of 2015 are returning to something resembling 
the magnitude of pre-crisis peak levels. If expectations are backwards looking and market 
sentiment shapes the expectations about future price growth, then we would expect to find that 
people overestimate future growth rates, when those expectations are measured during the 
upswing of a housing price cycle. We can note that this is consistent with the figures described 
above. 
The findings of Case, Shiller and Thompson can be interpreted in the light of the investor 
sentiment model of Barberis, Shelifer and Vishny. The finding that buyers are underreacting to 
news in a 1 year perspective can be explained by conservatism. The extremely high estimates of 
10 year growth rates can be interpreted as overreaction or as an effect of the representativeness 
heuristic that follows from a string of good news (increasing prices).  
In the commercial real estate markets in the U.S., which is populated by professionals, J. Clayton, 
Ling, and Naranjo (2009) put the concept of investor sentiment to a test over a ten-year period. 
They find that fundamentals explains most of the variation in market capitalization rates, however 
there is also significant evidence that sentiment played a part in the pricing of those markets. 
Hendershott and MacGregor (2005) give an attempt to refute prior findings of non-rational 
expectations, still conclude that irrationality played a crucial part in explaining market 
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capitalization rates in the U.S commercial property market from 1984-2002. Ling, Naranjo, and 
Scheick (2014) again show, this time for privately traded real estate markets, that sentiment 
induces long periods of mispricing. They also conclude that it is the limit to arbitrage that seems 
to be the key factor explaining that mispricing can persist over longer periods in privately traded 
markets, but in public markets it is short lived and corrected in the long run.  
Of the shortcomings that affect the imperfect housing markets, the lack of understanding of 
psychological factors may potentially be an important one.  
“Future research could explore the micro evidence on the behavior of individual 
homebuyers, particularly the role of liquidity, information, and psychology.” 
(Capozza et al., 2002, p. 24)   
At the end of Appendix A, I address herding behavior, which can be seen as an outcome arising 
from information processing and the tendency to follow each other’s actions. This is often seen as 
an extension or supplementary to the sentiment induced anomalies found in markets. Thus, it will 
give some further insights that capitalize on the theory outlined above. 
1.4.4  Sentiment in Norwegian Housing Markets 
Let us focus on expectations, and narrow in on the Norwegian housing market in particular. 
If we for a moment hypothesize that the Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny-model is valid for real estate 
markets, and apply it to the Norwegian housing market, then we get an interesting case-study to 
analyze. 
 
Figure 3 - (Statistics Norway, 2015b)  - House Price Index, by Type of Dwelling. 1992=100 
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The string of good news (for house-owners) can be seen in Figure 3, which displays the house 
price index for Norway at a national level. The clear, and strongly upward sloping trend is only 
interrupted twice (for less than 6 months at a time) in the course of 22 years. When described in 
the ways of overreaction, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny’s model would predict that a long run of 
positive news will lead to large deviations from fundamental values. Expectations of future price 
growth are high as it is consistent and representative of the price development the past 20 years. 
This form of extrapolation beyond the sample would lead to large negative realized average 
returns if the market were to turn negative.  
In consequence, there could be both an under-reaction and an over-reaction to a surprise turn of 
the market. If governed by conservatism then an under-reaction to the downturn in the market 
would ensue, and this would lead to perhaps a slower and smoother transition path downwards. 
However, if there is a string of bad news and people follow their representativeness heuristic, 
then an overreaction to the initial turn of the market will dominate.  
In the comprehensive official Norwegian report about the housing market (NOU 2002:2, 2002, p. 
66)  it is noted that the expected future price of a house will influence the decision to buy or sell. 
Efficiency of the market can only be expected if people do not exhibit beliefs or misconceptions 
about future prices that are systematically erroneous. A vague criteria is offered to explain what is 
meant by systematically erroneous beliefs. It is to be considered systematic, if people are not 
aware that future prices cannot be predicted with any reasonable accuracy in the long run. In the 
report it is suggested that this will only be a part of any criteria of systematically wrong beliefs, 
but it can hardly be seen as a definitive measure of whether price expectations are right or wrong. 
The findings of K. E. Case and Shiller (1990) that housing prices are predictable, seems to 
conflict with the before mentioned criteria of rationality. 
A more common criteria, as Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012) employ, is to regress actual 
observed future price onto expectations about future prices. If expectations are rational then the 
constant term should be zero and the slope coefficient equal to 1. This is thus a test about 
rationality, which predicts that the expectation of future prices should equate to actual future 
prices. It is in the author’s view a better criteria to judge market beliefs than the “systematically 
erroneous” –criteria suggested in NOU 2002:2.  
There are perhaps views and perceptions of how the market works in the general public that do 
not fit in well with the mechanisms that economists rely on. In the government report (NOU 
2002:2, p. 86)  it is cited indications that the Norwegian public believe that housing prices and 
interest rates will increase in tandem. However, in the user cost of housing model, the mechanism 
is that higher interest rates will, ceteris paribus, decrease house prices by increasing the user cost 
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of housing. This should, again ceteris paribus, result in less demand, and lower prices in the 
market. The circumstantial evidence then suggests that the public may hold false beliefs.  
 
Figure 4 - (Eiendom Norge, 2014, p. 43) Number of Articles Published in Norwegian Media Relating to Real Estate 
004Darkets. Source: Retriever  
Case and Shiller (2012) also discuss the role of media in transmitting social sentiment and 
“believable stories” that affect the price expectations.  In Norway we have seen media reports of 
late that indicate that 80% of all dwellings sold in the major cities are going for more than asking 
price. These are often interpreted as indicators of a hot, or booming market if you wish. This 
feature is highly unusual, as compared to other countries where final sales price usually is lower 
than the asking price (Beracha & Seiler, 2014). If expectations are backwards-looking and 
reinforcing, then stories like these in all likelihood contribute to further remove market prices 
from fundamentals. At the very least, we can conclude from Figure 4 that media attention and 
public interest in the housing market is quite sizable.  
In Figure 5 below, I have illustrated the deviation in sales price from asking price as a ratio of the 
asking price, for the sample of Oslo in the years 2006-2013. 
 
24 
 
 
Figure 5 – Difference of Final Sales Price From Asking Price as Ratio of Asking Price 
Hence, Figure 5 tells us the magnitude of how much over the asking price the sales price ended 
up, expressed as a percentage of the dwellings asking price. 
We see sizable differences over time, ranging from 8% in the boom year of 2006 turning into -
1,1% in the downturn year of 2008. The percentage of total apartments that sold for more than 
asking price is always more than half the sample size, except for the year of 2008. The variation 
in the sample ranges from 35% to 81% of the dwellings being sold for more than asking price. 
The percentage that sold for exactly the asking price is, perhaps surprisingly, low and varies 
between 6% to 10% of total transactions. These are in and of itself no indications of sentiment in 
the market, however we should take note of the tendency that dwellings are, on average, being 
sold for more than asking price. It seems like a puzzle to try to explain such behavior in a rational 
framework, if the asking price is to be interpreted as the willingness-to-accept on the behalf of 
sellers. However there could be strategic components to the asking prices, and they might also be 
affected by the value evaluation. Those aspects will be further highlighted in the empirical 
analysis, found in section 3 of this thesis. 
 
1.5 A note on Markets, Experience and Mitigation of 
Behavioral Biases 
As has been repeatedly noted through the theoretical part of this thesis, it is not necessarily a 
causal connection between the correction of behavioral biases and market exposure. However, a 
common conjecture in traditional theory is that market exposure, experience, or both, will in fact 
mitigate the biases which are found at an individual level. It is assumed that in the aggregate, 
behavioral biases cannot exist. As previously mentioned, Genesove and Mayer (2001), 
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Engelhardt (2003) and Bokhari and Geltner (2011) all find that loss aversion carries over to affect 
the final transaction prices in the market. The analysis of Hott (2012), which is described in 
Appendix A, also suggest that herding effects are evident in the aggregate. Also, we have 
discussed indications of charm pricing having a potentially positive effect on final sales prices 
(Allen & Dare, 2004), and that round numbers can be shown to be greatly overrepresented 
amongst final sales prices (Pope et al., 2014). Thus, the argument pertaining to the ability of 
markets to mitigate behavioral biases is still very much debatable. See the end of Appendix A for 
a more comprehensive overview of this issue.  
The next chapter marks the beginning of the empirical part of this thesis. Here, I will further 
delve into the effects of charm pricing and round numbers. However, as the data also contains 
value evaluations by professional surveyors I will start out the analysis with an inquiry into how 
these are formed. Potentially, they can act as anchors in the market for housing in Oslo.  
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2 The Oslo Housing Market - Empirical 
Analysis 
2.1 About The Data 
The dataset which I have obtained, covers housing transactions carried out in Oslo, during the 
period 01.01.2006-31.01.2014. The data is limited to dwellings which are defined by Statistics 
Norway to be of the “freeholder” type (“Selveier”), and therefore does not include any information 
about the developments in the housing cooperative market (“Borettslag”), or other such types of 
housing. The total dataset is comprised of 65 969 transactions. As the year 2014 only holds approx. 
600 observations, it is to a limited extent in which we can explain developments in that specific 
year. It is also worth noting that the dates above are the period for which the actual sale went 
through. There are 242 observations that were enlisted in the market before 01.01.2006. 
Another issue that possibly has a large impact on the sample is the fact that the data only contains 
transactions that were finalized. Therefore, we do not observe those dwellings which were listed in 
the market and then later withdrawn. The possibility of house owners to exit the market makes it 
difficult to assess empirically, how many dwellings actually make up the entire market and which 
could potentially be sold. The rate of entry and subsequent withdrawal could give an indication of 
the level of disagreement between sellers and buyers. The rate of exit could thus be interpreted as a 
gap between willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP). However, because of lack 
of data this WTA-WTP gap cannot be measured for this sample.  
According to Statistics Norway’s (2013) account of the real estate market in Oslo, the entire mass 
of inhabited freeholder dwellings in Oslo tallies to approximately 110 000 units. The total dataset 
acquired for this study is comprised of 64 969 transactions, e.g. 59% of the total housing mass was 
transacted over the course of the sample. Even if we assume that each individual dwelling is sold 
only once, i.e. no reoccurring sales, the data only covers a limited set of dwellings found in the 
municipality of Oslo. So even though OECD finds that Norway and the Nordic countries in general 
are amongst the most frequent movers (Andrews & Johansson, 2011), it is safe to say that most 
people do not change dwelling in the short to medium term. The data was retrieved from 
Eiendomsverdi AS which is a commercial company focusing on developing statistics and 
automated valuation models of real estate. A more thorough description of the dataset and its 
quality is to be found in Appendix C. 
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2.2 Data Cleaning Procedure  
To shape the dataset into a functional form which allows the succeeding analysis of charm pricing, 
round numbers effects and loss aversion,  I restricted the sample to those observations where none 
were missing; registration date, public registration date, salesprice, value valuation, living area (m
2
), 
asking price, build year and city district. 11 000 observations were thus dropped, mostly due to 
lacking public registration date (approx. 3000) or value evaluation (approx. 7000). This will then 
allow for analysis through a hedonic pricing model and OLS regression. 
I generate the variable TOM (time-on-market) as the difference between registration date 
(“RegDate”) and the actual sales date (“ActualSaleDate”), the duration is then expressed as number 
of days. There might be some self-censoring in the sample when it comes to time on market, as 
sellers can pull listings from the market and re-list again. This will bias the time on market variable 
downwards. However, the TOM-variable does not play a crucial part in the analysis, as it is found 
to be a very noisy measure. This is discussed further in section 3.2.2 Charm Pricing Regression 
Analysis. 
42 observations are dropped based on their location, being in the nearby forests of Oslo (“Marka”). 
They are technically speaking within the city limits, but are both older and larger than the average 
type of dwelling. I would argue that they are to be considered recreational properties, not primary 
dwellings. As such, they are dropped from the sample. A couple of observations were also deleted 
as they are located outside the municipality (Siggerud). 
A handful of observations were missing the city-district variable, but had postal codes which then 
were used to match the observations to the right city-district manually. This was less than 50 
observations.  
The “renovated year” variable was cleaned in a way such that occurrences like 20022006 were 
recoded to only hold the last observed date, ie 2006. Entries where “renovated year” was the same 
as the build year were set to missing “renovated year”. Observations where values were greater than 
2015 were set to missing. Please see the variable lists included in Appendix C for summary 
statistics and an explanation of all variables in the sample. 
The owner of the compiled dataset, Eiendomsverdi AS, has automated procedures to eliminate 
entries where obvious mistakes are detected in square meter price, number of rooms, size of the 
dwelling etc. The entire dataset stems from manual data, input by real estate agents into a common 
database. These transactions are then subsequently matched with the official records of the 
dwelling, when the transaction has been processed at the government registry. Then the automated 
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trimming by Eiendomsverdi AS’ system is conducted. Therefore we cannot say that the data is 
completely without errors. However, the impact of the erroneous entries should at least have been 
minimized. 
Further censoring of the sample is perhaps warranted as I have discovered some remaining false 
entries, such as typo’s in the salesprice, value valuation, asking price, livingarea etc. In a few 
observations we can clearly see indications of such when salesprice is 3 500 000, asking price is 
3 390 000, but value evaluation is registered as 3390. Or instances where asking price and value 
evaluation are 12 900 000 but salesprice is 1 300 000, suspecting thus that a zero is missing in the 
salesprice. Those kind of “fat-finger mistakes” are perhaps most likely for high value properties 
(price>10 000 000), where zeroes are hard to keep track of.  
However, as this procedure is time consuming and not readily done based on any pre-established 
objective criteria, I have decided against it. In the end, it is likely to only involve only a small 
percentage of the sample, and thus presumably will not affect the results in a decisive way. Alas, 
some degree of measurement error is likely to be present in the data. 
The core dataset which is fit for analysis purposes ultimately consist of 51 858 out of the 65 969 
original observed transactions in Oslo for the period 01.01.2006-31.01.2014 
2.3 The Average Dwelling 
We can make use of all the means for the variables to inform us about how the hypothetical average 
dwelling in the sample looks like: 
 The average dwelling in the data set is an apartment which has 89 square meters of living space, it 
has 2 bedrooms, is built around 1955, located on the 3rd floor (Norwegian numbering; 1st floor = 
ground floor), in the borough of Frogner, sold in the year 2013, after spending 25 days on the 
market and cost 3.5 million NOK. However, to the informed reader it should be clear that no such 
apartment actually exist with all these particular attributes. For instance, an apartment of 89 square 
meters in Frogner usually sell for 4.4 million in the datasample. Therefore we must keep in mind 
that the average dwelling is a useful hypothetical construct which is put together to quickly 
summarize the diversity of the data into one single entity, however it is not representative of  all of 
the specific subsamples, when those are assessed separately. 
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Table 1: Type of Dwelling 
From the geographical distribution of housing transactions, the data indicate that the boroughs 
Frogner, Grünerløkka, St. Hanshaugen and Sagene are responsible for almost 50% of all of the 
transactions observed in the data. The central boroughs thus transact far more often than other 
boroughs, and are overrepresented in the sample. More on this, and the spatial distribution of 
dwellings in Appendix C. 
In section 3, I will focus on the relations between value evaluations, asking prices and final sales 
prices. Thus, it is helpful to keep in mind some of their respective attributes: 
The value evaluation found in the sample is set by a professional surveyor, after conducting a check 
on-site for the dwelling in question. Thus, any variables that are unobserved in the data, but evident 
to the surveyor will likely be integrated in the surveyor’s estimate of market worth. Surveyors might 
have an incentive to give generous estimates, as their business is largely based on referrals from 
realtors. An attempt to account for this is beyond the scope of the data and this thesis. 
The asking price is set by the seller, most commonly with the aid of a realtor. As realtors often have 
more knowledge of the current market conditions than the seller himself, it is plausible that the 
realtor’s advice for design of listing price is followed in most cases. But again, this cannot be tested 
with the data. 
The final sales price is determined by the market, which in Norway has the form of an auction, most 
similar to an ascending-bid auction type (English auction). From 2014 and onwards it has been 
required that bids are submitted electronically. The institutional and legal framework for the 
housing market is potentially a decisive factor for the behavior observed in the market. The 
 
Variables Apartment 
=«Leilighet» 
Detached 
house 
= «Enebolig» 
Row-house 
=Rekkehus» 
Semi-detached house 
(duplex) 
= «Tomannsbolig» 
Number of observations 41 233 4522 3042 3105 
Mean living area 70 m
2 
191 m
2
 132 m
2
 149 m
2
 
Mean sale price 2.985.558 6.754.531 4.527.406 5.369.821 
Mean asking price 2.880.766 6.651.999 4.363.855 5.185.263 
Mean value evaluation 2.944.792 6.788.886 4.434.842 5.274.467 
Mean difference of: 
(final sale price - asking price) 
104.792 102.532 163.551 184.559 
Mean difference of: 
(final sale price - value 
evaluation) 
41.020 
 
-34.355 92.564 95.355 
Mean difference of: 
(asking price - value evaluation) 
-64.025 -136.887 -70.987 -89.204 
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Norwegian housing market differ from the U.S. market in a number of ways, however only a select 
few are noted here:  
 Strategic default (jingle-mail) is not commonplace like in the U.S. See Holm and Astrup 
(2009) for more on the Norwegian institutional setting in relation to default. 
 In Norway, only the seller solicits the services of a realtor, as opposed to the U.S. where 
both seller and buyer usually have their realtors bargain for them. Thus, the asymmetry of 
information and negotiation experience is perhaps expected to be larger in the Norwegian 
setting. 
Now, let us move over to some summary statistics of the relevant pricing measures: 
The mean asking price in the sample was 3.4 million kr (or 3.490.000 when charm pricing is being 
utilized), and the average difference of final sales price from asking price was 113 000 kr above 
asking price. That is, 3,3% of the value of the average apartment in the sample, (
113 000
3 433 484
 = 3,3%). 
The average difference in asking price from value evaluation was -72 238 kr, meaning that the list 
price, on average, was posted lower than the assessed value, as given by the professional surveyor. 
We also find a large standard deviation of 181 248 kr, implying that there is a considerable amount 
of variation in the data. 
The average difference in sales price from value evaluation was 40 775 kr, meaning that the average 
assessed market price was a bit undervalued, but only to the extent of 1,15% of the worth of the 
average dwelling (
40 775
3 546 295
 =  1,15%).  The Oslo housing market has mostly seen year on year 
price increases over the years in the sample, and the finding that the mean sales price is higher than 
the mean value evaluation could suggest that the surveyors do not sufficiently adjust to current 
(booming) market conditions quickly enough, when giving estimates of market worth.  The 
standard deviation of the difference in sales price from value evaluation is quite sizable, at 411 683 
kr, indicating that the point predictions of an assessor can vary substantially from the final sales 
price. 
In table 1, we can better assess the variation in the data which is categorized by the type of 
dwelling. First we should note the overwhelming majority of apartments, as type of dwelling, being 
transacted in Oslo. Most people in Oslo live in apartments, and their transaction volume is almost 
80% of the entire sample. If we think of the difference of asking price from value evaluation as 
“under-pricing”, then all types of dwellings are under-priced, on average. While apartments are 
“under-priced” more in percentage terms than detached houses (2,22% to 2,06%), the higher 
average price of detached houses make the under-pricing of these dwellings larger in absolute 
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prices. Thus, in relation to their own average asking prices, the apartments have the strongest degree 
of under-pricing when they register in the market. 
Furthermore, the fact that detached houses are the only type of dwelling that has a negative gap 
between final sale price and value evaluation, on average is worth noting. This implies that for this 
specific category of housing the value evaluations are higher, on average, than the final sale price. 
Thus, the professional assessors tend to overestimate the worth of this category of dwellings in 
particular.  
Perhaps this is due to the dissimilarity of houses, which translates into difficulty in assessing a large 
house and property. After all, there are fewer similar objects in the market by which to compare and 
assess market value. The relative similarity of apartments might make it easier to assess the market 
value, as they appear more frequently, and assessors therefore learn to adjust their estimates 
quickly. In theory, they should not need to learn, they are rational and can calculate of course, 
however to explain the data, a story of adaptive learning seems fruitful. Another plausible 
interpretation is that the average measures of prices for detached houses is more susceptible to large 
outliers, as their price range is wider than that of apartments. We will return to this issue in section 
3.1 in particular, and chapter 3 as a whole is devoted to further investigation of the complex 
relations between value evaluations, asking prices and final sale prices. 
 
Figure 6 – Mean Time-on-Market 
In Figure 6, I have graphed the differences in time-on-market, a measure of how fast the dwellings 
are sold, for the different boroughs. Here we find some puzzling results, as “Bjerke” has the 
quickest turnover of dwellings, with an average time-on-market at just above 20 days. In the other 
end of the scale we find “Sentrum” as the slowest borough to sell in, but with only 154 observations 
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across 8 years any statistical inference is of limited reliability. “Frogner” has quite a high mean of 
time-on-market, which is surprising given that it holds 20% of all transactions, and housing demand 
for this specific borough seems to be high.  
It should be noted however, that time-on-market in the range of 20-30 days should be considered 
quite fast. There is considerable variation in the time-on-market within the different municipalities 
in Norway. As Oslo is one of the fastest growing cities in the country, the time-on-market has been 
comparatively low. If we look to the U.S. housing market, which has recovered since the financial 
crisis but is still below peak in terms of prices, the average listing time the past 5 years has been 
above 100 days (Zillow, 2015). In the UK, the average time on market has varied between approx. 
70 days to 45 days over the years 2010-2014 (Hometrack, 2014). 
Now, let us have a look at how variation in value evaluation and asking price can have an impact on 
the final negotiated house price. 
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3 The Interlinkages Between Sales Price, 
Asking Price and Value Evaluation 
 
In the dataset I have acquired for this analysis, there are 3 indicators of a dwellings market worth; 
the value evaluation set by the professional surveyor, the asking price set by the real estate 
agent/owner-occupier and lastly the final transaction price. In most studies, it is common to only 
observe final transaction price and asking price. The value evaluation thus gives us an “extra degree 
of freedom”- sort of speak, and it is why the intent of this section is to dissect the connections 
between the three price measures. In the following analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
are presented, unless otherwise stated. Throughout the regression analysis the coefficients’ 
significance levels are calculated using robust standard errors, unless otherwise stated. The 
Huber/White standard errors which are heteroscedasticity-consistent and easily implemented in 
Stata are the preferred option as the data show clear indications of heteroscedasticity. Log-log and 
log-linear specifications were considered, however as they showed similar results as the linear 
specification, the latter was preferred. In all of the reported regressions, the omitted category for 
dwelling type is “detached houses” and “Østensjø” for the borough dummies, thus serving as 
baseline for the estimated coefficients.   
3.1 The Value Evaluation – An Unbiased Estimate? 
Is the assessed value that the professional surveyor gives for each property an unbiased estimate of 
the market value for the dwelling? 
A simple OLS regression was conducted for the full sample, and by type of dwelling of the form: 
Salesprice  =  β0 + β1(Value Evaluation)    (1) 
We see from Table 2 that the assessors’ value evaluations are good indicators of market value. For 
the full sample, the value evaluation explains 96.5% of the total variation in sales prices. In the case 
of detached houses, the value evaluation explains less of the final sales price, as compared to the 
other types of dwellings. This is in line with the proposed interpretation of a more heterogeneous 
market for detached houses, which makes it more difficult for the assessors to estimate the market 
worth of that type of dwelling. However, the standard errors for detached houses are comparatively 
quite low, perhaps indicating that row-houses and semi-detached houses are more heterogeneous. 
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Table 2: Simple OLS Regression of Salesprice on Value Evaluation 
 
β-coefficient from 
OLS regression 
Robust standard 
errors 
R
2 
Number of 
Observations 
Full sample .95*** .0025 .9654 51858 
By Type of Housing     
Apartment .95*** .0030 .9641 41233 
Row House .96*** .0082 .9444 3042 
Semi-Detached House .95*** .0092 .9312 3104 
Detached House .89*** .0070 .9346 4479 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of variance 
Even though the surveyors are quite accurate on average, it is interesting to see which property 
characteristics are relevant to explain the value evaluation itself. As far as the author knows, a large 
dataset which holds both value evaluations by professional surveyors and sales price, has yet to be 
analyzed. This gives us the opportunity to assess which factors are incorporated in the surveyor’s 
market value estimates, and which are not accounted for. In most cases the analysis does not include 
a value evaluation, and thus may partly fail to control for unobserved characteristics of the dwelling 
(examples are; (Allen & Dare, 2004; Beracha & Seiler, 2014; Palmon et al., 2004)). The following 
description can thus give us an indicator of how much of the variation in data, which can be 
ascribed to previously unobservable characteristics. First, let us look at which property attributes 
which can explain the value evaluation. 
The specification is as follows: 
Value Evaluation = β(Living Area, Build Year, Actual Sale Year, Actual Sale Month, Apartment 
Dummy, Row House Dummy, Semi-Detached House Dummy,  City Borough Dummies)  
Where β is a vector of the regression coefficients, including an intercept The time trend is made up 
by two components, actual sale year which runs from 2006 to 2014, and actual sale month 
indicating which month the dwelling was sold (1 through 12). 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Value Evaluation on Dwelling Characteristics 
Dep var: Value Evaluation Coefficient Robust Standard Error t 
Livingarea 35,975.8*** 305.7 117.67 
Build_Year 4,088.5*** 208.9 19.57 
Actual_Sale_Year 187,923.2*** 1,823.0 103.08 
Actual_Sale_Month 16,785.0*** 1,289.9 13.01 
Dummy variables: 
 
   
Apartment 58,327.5 37,913.2 1.54 
RowHouse -133,987.0*** 32,471.2 -4.13 
SemiDetached -67,433.9* 37,780.7 -1.78 
Alna -367,052.3*** 29,075.6 -12.62 
Bjerke 260,140.3*** 23,182.0 11.22 
Frogner 1,681,923.2*** 25,791.8 65.21 
Gamle_Oslo 675,252.3*** 21,105.1 31.99 
Grorud -493,664.5*** 45,500.1 -10.85 
Grünerløkka 862,202.1*** 21,889.0 39.39 
Nordre_Aker 1,164,602.8*** 24,168.5 48.19 
Nordstrand 745,236.7*** 29,364.9 25.38 
Sagene 898,041.7*** 21,055.5 42.65 
Sentrum 1,337,650.0*** 42,224.7 31.68 
St_Hanshaugen 1,251,024.9*** 22,990.3 54.42 
Stovner -797,738.2*** 27,400.3 -29.11 
Søndre_Nordstrand -815,395.1*** 25,695.2 -31.73 
Ullern 1,248,589.0*** 26,466.0 47.18 
Vestre_Aker 1,261,297.0*** 28,227.4 44.68 
_cons -386,394,951.6*** 3,686,743.4 -104.81 
F statistic 3,132.98   
R-squared 0.81   
Number of Observations 51,858   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of variance 
 
Table 3 is the results of a hedonic regression to see which factors; such as geographical location, 
build year, size of dwelling and other characteristics, can explain the value-evaluation given by the 
surveyor. The omitted category for dwelling type is “detached houses” and “Østensjø” for the 
borough dummies, thus serving as baseline for the estimated coefficients. We see that all included 
variables are highly statistically significant and seem reasonable given the general differences in 
price levels across the different boroughs and dwelling types. All coefficients have the expected 
signs, except the indicator for apartment, which is quite surprisingly not statistically significant. The 
result also shows that the effect of semi-detached houses is only significant at the 10% level. 
We note that there is still a large portion of unexplained variation in the data, which suggest that 
there are still other factors that the value evaluation incorporates, which is not easily controlled for. 
Even when conducting a reduced sample regression with observations that include more specific 
dwelling characteristics, such as; floor of dwelling, year of renovation, number of bedrooms etc., 
the level of unexplained variation in the data remains. It is therefore likely that simple metrics are 
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not a perfect substitute for a hands-on survey of a dwelling. There is after all many things about a 
dwelling that are perhaps difficult to quantify, such as the state of, or quality of a dwelling and light 
conditions. 
Now we can move on to see how well the sales price is explained by the value evaluation. We can 
augment the value evaluations with the observed property characteristics to see if the assessors do 
or do not sufficiently incorporate all the relevant information into their estimates. If the assessors’ 
value evaluations correctly weights the different property characteristics, then we would expect to 
find that the coefficients of those added variables would be negligible, as the information is already 
accounted for through the value evaluation. 
Table 4: Regression Results of Sales Price on Value Evaluation and Dwelling Characteristics 
Dep.Var: SalesPrice Coefficient Standard Error t 
Value_Evaluation 0.9*** 0.0 142.28 
Livingarea 1,874.9***   218.3 8.59 
Build_Year 94.5* 54.7 1.73 
Actual_Sale_Year 17,822.4*** 1,253.4 14.22 
Actual_Sale_Month -7,320.5*** 520.7 -14.06 
Dummy variables 
 
   
Apartment -155,375.2*** 14,576.9 -10.66 
RowHouse -8,482.7 13,209.7 -0.64 
SemiDetached 23,221.9 15,826.0 1.47 
Alna -108,192.0*** 11,010.4 -9.83 
Bjerke -23,552.9** 9,768.2 -2.41 
Frogner 52,880.4*** 12,595.1 4.20 
Gamle_Oslo -15,183.8 9,531.5 -1.59 
Grorud -145,054.1*** 14,328.0 -10.12 
Grünerløkka -13,331.3 10,190.2 -1.31 
Nordre_Aker 145,021.1*** 13,136.6 11.04 
Nordstrand -16,726.6 13,247.5 -1.26 
Sagene 22,947.3** 10,067.0 2.28 
Sentrum -79,239.8*** 19,041.2 -4.16 
St_Hanshaugen 40,443.7*** 11,324.0 3.57 
Stovner -170,136.6*** 10,676.8 -15.94 
Søndre_Nordstrand -213,748.3*** 10,544.2 -20.27 
Ullern 37,544.2*** 13,764.5 2.73 
Vestre_Aker -6,848.6 13,950.0 -0.49 
_cons -35,587,456.6*** 2,552,647.7 -13.94 
F statistic 18,489.59   
R-squared 0.9675   
Number of 
Observations 
51,858   
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of variance 
We note that the value evaluation is still a good estimate of a dwellings market worth, however as 
it’s coefficient now is notably lower than before, it tells us that the value evaluation is not entirely 
incorporating all relevant information in a sufficient way. When holding the value evaluation 
constant, we see that there are systematic and statistically significant differences between the 
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different boroughs, which might indicate that the surveyors do not sufficiently account for the effect 
of the location on price. It also follows from the results that surveyors tend to underestimate the 
effect the size of the living area has on price. The apartment indicator is now the only dwelling type 
indicator that is statistically significant, and it is negative.  
Overall, we see that the R
2
 only increases incrementally from the initial simple regression of value 
evaluation on sales price. The R
2
 of 0.9654, to be found in table 2, increases marginally to 0.9675 as 
we include a dwelling’s characteristics in the regression (table 4). It is therefore reasonable to infer 
that the value evaluation and the observable characteristics of a dwelling both contain much of the 
same information-signal, which is relevant to explain the final sale price of a dwelling. However, as 
the coefficients on most of the property characteristics are highly statistical significant we can say 
that they refine the information which was already contained in the surveyor’s estimate. Still, there 
are residuals that both value evaluation and observable characteristics cannot account for. Thus, we 
do not have a perfect account of the variation in the data. However, the unexplained variation is 
now quite small, and it is within reason to make use of these data for modelling purposes. 
3.1.1 The Clustering of Value Evaluations 
Figure 7 gives us an overview of the distribution of value evaluations, across the range of 1 million 
to 6 million kr. It shows a marked influence of clustering at round numbers ending with 50 000, 
100 000 or on million markers.  
 
Figure 7 - Distribution of Value Evaluations 
To get a better impression of the level of clustering, the histogram in Figure 8 tells us that the 
clustering is strongest at price points which are multiples of 500 000kr, while multiples of 
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100 000kr and 50 000kr follow close behind. The extremely low frequency of dwellings with prices 
that are not cleanly divisible by 50 000kr is evident by the lack of mass found in these price bins.  
It seems that the convenience rounding story has some merit. Perhaps surveyors do not want to give 
too precise market value estimates, and thus they only make use of a coarse pricing grid when 
assessing a dwellings value. We can of course only speculate as to why this is the case, but a story 
of convenience rounding certainly fits with the data.  
 
Figure 8 - Value Evaluations - Clustering at Round Numbers 
The round numbers bias which surveyors seem to be subjected to, displays a behavior that is 
changing across different price levels. The clustering at round numbers that ends with 50 000kr is 
strong for the price level between 2 and 3 million kr. However, when we look at the price range 
between 9 and 10 million kr, there is almost no value evaluations at all that make use of the prices 
ending with 50 000kr. What is found is a reliance on the use of half-million and million markers, 
and to a lesser extent the use of prices ending with multiples of 100 000kr. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to describe the coarseness of the pricing grid that the surveyors make use of to price a 
dwelling, as being relative to the price range of the dwelling itself. That is, for the low price range 
(up until about 5 million kr) there is extensive use of prices ending in 50 000kr, thus differentiating 
between the different dwellings at a 50k detail level. However, for the medium price range (value 
evaluations above 5 million kr), there is a decreasing reliance on the prices ending with 50 000kr, 
and a notable more extensive use of value evaluations ending with 100 000kr.  At the high price 
range (above 10 million kr) there is almost an exclusive reliance on 500 000kr markers and million 
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markers to differentiate between the dwellings. Therefore, it seems like the coarseness of the 
surveyors’ pricing grid moves inversely with the price level. It migrates from a high level of 
detail/accuracy when prices are low, to a low level of detail/accuracy when prices are high. 
We will later on, in section 2.4, assess how the value evaluation might serve as an anchor in the 
decision-making process of the participants in the housing market. 
3.2 Asking Prices – Charm Pricing: 
What is an asking price? It might seem like a simple question, which we would like to answer in a 
simple way. Unfortunately, it does not have such a straight-forward interpretation. The asking price 
is the price which the seller set on his dwelling when it is listed for sale in the market. So far, so 
good, but it is when we want to interpret the price we run into ambiguity. Is the asking price to be 
understood as the willingness-to-accept? Is it a strategic information signal in the game of housing 
allocation? Is it the starting point of negotiations? Can the design and level of asking price have a 
positive effect on the final sales price, so called charm pricing? The following analysis outlines a 
less than simplistic answer, with a focus on the latter question. 
Amongst all the possible asking prices in the observable range of our dataset, from 490 000 kr to 
35 000 000 kr, we only have 865 unique values. Meaning that there are 34 510 000 possible values 
that could be chosen as asking price (if we limit ourselves to integers), which have not been used in 
the real estate market in Oslo over the period of 2006-2014. That is a tremendous 99.75% of the 
possible range which is not being utilized! This sort of clustering is found in both value evaluations, 
final sale prices and as we will discuss further here, asking prices.  
While that may be the case, one could argue that in the price range from 10 million to 35 million 
there are only a few handfuls of transactions, so that the whole range should not plausibly be filled 
by such a low number of observations. However, if we look at one of the most common ranges of 
dwelling prices, that is 2.5 to 3.5 million kr, which holds roughly 23% of our entire sample, the 
clustering of asking prices is still evident. Out of the 1 million possible asking prices, we only 
observe 127 unique values. Meaning that, 98.73% of the possible asking prices are not being used. 
If we allow for a simple story of convenience rounding, so that market participants only deal with 
multiples of 1 000kr, then still only 12,7% of all possible values are being used. 
Over the entire sample, we find that the correlation of asking price and value evaluation is 0.9968. It 
seems to be true that people, or at least the realtors they hire, to a large extent follows the value 
evaluation of the professional surveyor when setting the asking price. This seems to be a reasonable 
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approach to the design of listing prices, as long as the value evaluations are good estimates of 
market value. 
As we can read from Table 5, the most common design of asking price is to set it exactly equal to 
the value evaluation, and 41,5% of the dwellings exhibit this sort of pricing behavior. Out of the 
listing prices which are different from the value evaluation, the most frequently used are from 
10 000kr below the value evaluation to 200 000kr below value evaluation.  
Table 5: Most Common Listing Prices; As Measured by Difference From Value Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A noteworthy aspect of the data is that only 0,84% of the transactions in the sample chose an asking 
price above the value evaluation. In this regard, the value evaluation seems to be setting the upper 
bound for asking prices in most cases. 
3.2.1 The Clustering of Asking Prices 
The histograms displayed in the Figures 9 and 10 are the same as those shown in the Figures 7 and 
8, only this time it is the distribution of asking prices and not value evaluations. We can now 
evidently see that the clustering of prices are just below the round numbers that are multiples of 
100 000kr. This is what we call charm pricing. Interestingly it seems as the charm pricing 
mechanism does not relate to the round numbers ending in 50 000kr. Perhaps it evokes a too 
detailed price grid that is traded off against the convenience of rounding? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Asking price – Value 
evaluation) 
Frequency (% of total 
sample) 
(Asking price – Value 
evaluation) 
Frequency (% of 
total sample) 
0 41,5 % -210 000 3,0% 
-10 000 12,7 % -100 000 2,6% 
-110 000 8,4 % -160 000 2,0% 
-60 000 7,0 % -150 000 2,0% 
-50 000 4,9 % -200 000 1,2 % 
Total frequency of most common charm listing prices i.e. excluding  (asking price = value evaluation): 43,8% 
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Figure 9 – Distribution of Asking Prices, overview 
 
Figure 10 – Distribution of Asking Prices, Clustering at Charm Prices 
From Table 5 it appears likely that the three out of the top four most common listing price strategies 
are designed such that they will yield a charm listing price. As we now know, the value evaluations 
tend to be in round numbers. Thus subtracting either 10 000kr, 110 000kr or 60 000kr will yield a 
listing price in the form of 1 990 000, 1 890 000 or 2 940 000, if the value evaluation was 
2 000 000kr. However the subtraction of 60 000kr from value evaluation is almost exclusively 
being used for dwellings where the value evaluation ended with 50 000kr, thus yielding a charm 
asking price in the form of 1 990 000. The occurrence of the -60 000 from value evaluation is 
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almost entirely found in the price range below 6 million, again perhaps indicating that the 
coarseness of the pricing grid increases as the nominal values increases. 
In fact, most of the studies described in this paper has been conducted in the American markets, 
where values are denominated in dollars. If there was no such thing as charm pricing effects and 
round numbers bias, then we should observe the charm pricing and round numbers bias for the 
dollar equivalent value, stated in Norwegian currency terms. E.g. if there was an effect of housing 
prices ending in $9 999, then the equivalent in Norwegian kroners at the current exchange rate of 
7,4761kr/dollar would be 74 753,5239kr. This claim is rejected by the data. Thus in this way, the 
data this thesis’ presents further validates the findings of Allen and Dare, and PPS. 
3.2.2 Charm Pricing Regression Analysis 
Let us further investigate the design of asking prices, and whether or not we can classify them as 
charm pricing. 
In Allen and Dare (2004) they identify charm listing prices as the occurrence of listing prices 
ending with $500, $900, $4 900, $5 000, $9 000 and $9 900. Their results show that all of these 
listing price designs have a positive effect on the final transaction price, although their magnitude 
varies across the different price segments of the housing market. Dwellings that transacted in the 
range of $300,000 to $1 million have the strongest price increase for listing prices ending with 
$5000. For dwellings worth in the range of $ 200,000 to $300,000 the largest positive effect is for 
listing prices ending with $ 9 000. In the consequent analysis, we will closely follow the empirical 
approach of Allen and Dare. However, there is a matter of subjectivity in the conversion of the 
charm-prices identified by Allen and Dare, to properly apply it to the Norwegian housing market. 
As there is no agreed-upon norm of what is strictly considered a charm-price and what is not, we 
need to go with intuition and logical reasoning when choosing the listing price designs which are to 
be considered charm-prices in a Norwegian context. I propose the following designs of listing price 
to be considered as charm prices: 
Listing prices ending with 50 000kr, 90 000kr, 490 000kr, 900 000 kr, 990 000kr. 
The dummies constructed for these listing prices are mutually exclusive, that is a listing price of 
1 990 000, does only give an indicator equal 1 to the 990 000kr charm dummy, and not the 
90 000kr dummy or the 900 000kr dummy. A listing price of 5 490 000 yields an indicator dummy 
equal 1 for the 490 000kr dummy, and not for the 90 000kr dummy. In this way the 90 000kr 
dummy picks up all other charm listing prices ending in 90 000, e.g 2 190 000kr or 3 890 000kr. 
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To control for other listing price designs and check the robustness of the charm listing price-effects, 
I also construct dummies for round number pricing. Listing prices ending with *00 000kr, 
500 000kr or 1 000 000kr are identified as round numbers. The round number pricing dummies are 
also constructed in a mutually exclusive way, analogous to the charm pricing dummies. To be 
explicitly clear; A dwelling cannot have both an indicator for charm pricing and round number 
pricing at the same time. The order of priority is such that a listing price ending with 900 000kr, is 
identified as charm pricing, and not a *00 000kr round number. See Table 6 for a full description of 
the design of dummy variables, which is arranged in hierarchical order after which dummy 
dominate the others when there is a conflict. 
Table 6: Variable Definitions for Round Numbers and Charm Price Dummies 
CD990k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 990 000 
e.g. 4 990 000, 2 990 000 etc 
CD900k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 900 000 
e.g. 1 900 000, 7 900 000 etc 
CD490k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 490 000 
e.g. 2 490 000, 5 490 000 
CD90k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 90 000 
e.g. 2 390 000, 6 190 000 etc 
CD50k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 50 000 
e.g. 1 750 000, 4 450 000 etc 
Dmill Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with  * 000 000 
That is on a million marker exactly. 
e.g. 1 000 000 or 5 000 000 etc 
D500k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with 500 000. 
That is, exactly on a half million marker. 
 
D100k Dummy variable indicating that the asking price ends with *00 000.  
That is, on a hundred thousand marker exactly. 
e.g. 1 800 000, 3 400 000, 6 700 000, 9 200 000, etc 
Except: 
 asking prices ending with 900 000 which are categorized as CD900k. 
 asking prices ending in 500 000 which are categorized as D500k 
 asking prices ending on the million mark exactly, which are categorized as Dmill. 
The chosen charm dummies all seem to be reasonable to consider as charm-prices, however the 
50 000kr marker is likely to reflect both a degree of charm pricing, and the tendency of sellers to set 
asking price equal to value evaluation. The 50k dummy can thus be interpreted in both directions. 
More on this issue is found in the results section. 
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I would like to assess if there are differences in the charm pricing effect across different market 
segments. The market segments are defined by the magnitude of the final sale price. I divide the 
sample into 3 groups based on the following price ranges: 
Group 1 = Sale price ≤ 3 000 000 kr 
Group 2 = 3 000 000kr < Sale price ≤ 5 000 000 kr 
Group 3 = Sale price > 5 000 000kr 
These groupings are of course subjective in nature. However, they will help facilitate the analysis 
by neatly splitting the sample in three reasonably sized partitions. Group 1 is identified by a suffix 
“_1” to the charm listing price regression dummy, i.e. CD50k_1 is the charm pricing dummy for 
listing prices ending with 50 000, in the price range below or at 3 000 000 kr. Similarly, Group 2 
and 3 are identified by the _2 and _3 suffixes to the relevant charm price and round price dummies 
for their price ranges (as defined in the text above). 
Table 7 is a summary of how widespread the use of charm pricing and round number pricing is in 
the Oslo market for housing. 
Table 7: Charm Listing Price and Round Number Listing Price in Proportions per Group. 
Charm Listing Price Group 1 
Listing price ≤ 3 000 000 
n = 27032 
Group 2 
3 000 000 < Listing price ≤ 5 000 000 
n = 15740 
Group 3 
Listing price > 
5 000 000 
n = 9086 
CD50k 0,263761 0,22967 0,18446 
CD90k 0,322988 0,24028 0,103236 
CD490k 0,059004 0,060038 0,048206 
CD900k 0,019791 0,039072 0,085076 
CD990k 0,059078 0,086595 0,060753 
Total CHARM 0,724623 0,655654 0,48173 
Round Number Listing 
Price    
D100k 0,131104 0,222173 0,294519 
D500k 0,020531 0,048094 0,124367 
Dmill 0,012541 0,022173 0,068127 
Total ROUND 0,164176 0,29244 0,487013 
Total non-CHARM & non-
ROUND 
0,111202 0,051906 0,031257 
We note that charm pricing is the majority pricing strategy for this dataset, as it is more frequently 
used than round number pricing. The exception is the high price dwellings found in Group 3, where 
charm pricing and round number pricing have virtually an identical share.  In the total sample, 
listing price strategies that are not round number or charm pricing constitute less than 8% of the 
transactions.  
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The regression model specification is as follows:       
Salesprice = β(Charm Listing Price Dummies, Round Numbers Listing Price Dummies, 
Value Evaluation, Dwelling’s Physical Characteristics, Time Trend, City Borough 
Dummies) 
(2) 
Where β is a vector of the regression coefficients, including an intercept. The regressions are 
conducted separately for each of the three price groups. 
Table 8: Charm and Round Numbers Listing Price Regression Results for Group 1: Salesprice ≤ 3 000 000 kr   
Dep. Var: Salesprice                        Coefficient                Robust Standard Error           t 
CD50k_1 12,501.7*** 3,679.9 3.40 
CD90k_1 -1,537.7 3,611.8 -0.43 
CD490k_1 7,670.3 5,414.2 1.42 
CD900k_1 13,258.2* 7,841.8 1.69 
CD990k_1 -392.5 5,802.9 -0.07 
D100k_1 35,719.7*** 4,291.8 8.32 
D500k_1 33,950.5*** 8,165.8 4.16 
Dmill_1 53,733.6*** 11,344.5 4.74 
Value_Evaluation 0.8*** 0.0 180.96 
Livingarea 2,191.7*** 124.7 17.57 
Build_Year 24.5 35.3 0.69 
Actual_Sale_Year 13,096.8*** 606.6 21.59 
Actual_Sale_Month -3,022.9*** 335.2 -9.02 
Apartment 17,221.9 23,706.9 0.73 
RowHouse 20,007.5 24,394.3 0.82 
SemiDetached 6,013.0 26,240.9 0.23 
Alna -27,673.1*** 7,565.4 -3.66 
Bjerke 8,532.1 6,985.2 1.22 
Frogner 49,278.1*** 7,543.8 6.53 
Gamle_Oslo 21,379.4*** 6,709.0 3.19 
Grorud -36,877.8*** 10,505.7 -3.51 
Grünerløkka 23,473.1*** 6,724.9 3.49 
Nordre_Aker 31,155.2*** 7,899.6 3.94 
Nordstrand -8,340.4 8,311.8 -1.00 
Sagene 50,266.4*** 6,996.5 7.18 
Sentrum -12,409.1 15,411.4 -0.81 
St_Hanshaugen 55,866.6*** 7,448.0 7.50 
Stovner -62,038.8*** 7,588.1 -8.18 
Søndre_Nordstrand -64,009.4*** 7,396.1 -8.65 
Ullern 26,674.3*** 8,655.0 3.08 
Vestre_Aker 9,212.2 8,780.4 1.05 
_cons -26,111,437.8*** 1,228,443.5 -21.26 
F statistic 5,441.93   
R-squared 0.88   
N 27,032   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of variance 
 
Dxxxk_1: Salesprice ≤ 3 000 000 kr Dxxxk_2: 3 000 000 kr < Salesprice ≤ 5 000 000 kr Dxxxk_3: 5 000 000 kr < Salesprice 
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Table 9: Charm and Round Numbers Listing Price Regression Results for Group 2: 3 000 000 kr < Salesprice ≤ 
5 000 000 kr   
Dep. Var: Salesprice                           Coefficient                  Robust Standard Error          t 
CD50k_2 30,432.8*** 10,828.9 2.81 
CD90k_2 -3,341.6 10,791.4 -0.31 
CD490k_2 -5,259.2 13,401.5 -0.39 
CD900k_2 84,182.2*** 14,820.4 5.68 
CD990k_2 -1,714.3 12,313.5 -0.14 
D100k_2 55,890.3*** 11,037.6 5.06 
D500k_2 50,948.3*** 15,290.9 3.33 
Dmill_2 86,572.1*** 17,717.0 4.89 
Value_Evaluation 0.7*** 0.0 99.54 
Livingarea 1,026.1*** 158.3 6.48 
Build_Year -14.6 72.2 -0.20 
Actual_Sale_Year 11,755.0*** 1,289.9 9.11 
Actual_Sale_Month -5,241.3*** 710.1 -7.38 
Apartment -70,866.3*** 14,387.0 -4.93 
RowHouse -4,671.8 12,634.6 -0.37 
SemiDetached -2,029.5 14,547.2 -0.14 
Alna -112,815.7*** 19,709.0 -5.72 
Bjerke -12,272.9 16,460.1 -0.75 
Frogner -26,212.7* 15,589.8 -1.68 
Gamle_Oslo -38,333.6** 16,220.0 -2.36 
Grorud -126,399.2*** 19,475.5 -6.49 
Grünerløkka -52,219.7*** 16,294.7 -3.20 
Nordre_Aker 67,354.8*** 15,535.6 4.34 
Nordstrand -47,031.6*** 15,777.7 -2.98 
Sagene -13,674.8 16,085.1 -0.85 
Sentrum -152,140.2** 65,770.2 -2.31 
St_Hanshaugen -17,883.0 15,234.7 -1.17 
Stovner -151,738.3*** 17,579.8 -8.63 
Søndre_Nordstrand -212,811.5*** 16,430.1 -12.95 
Ullern -33,871.9** 14,991.5 -2.26 
Vestre_Aker -33,646.2** 14,676.2 -2.29 
_cons -22,461,890.7*** 2,622,615.4 -8.56 
F statistic 834.34   
R-squared 0.75   
N 15,740   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of variance 
 
Dxxxk_1: Salesprice ≤ 3 000 000 kr Dxxxk_2: 3 000 000 kr < Salesprice ≤ 5 000 000 kr Dxxxk_3: 5 000 000 kr < Salesprice 
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Table 10: Charm and Round Numbers Listing Price Regression Results for Group 3: 5 000 000 kr < Salesprice 
Dep. Var: Salesprice                      Coefficient                Robust Standard Error        t 
CD50k_3 5,619.9 37,380.6 0.15 
CD90k_3 -774.1 38,162.5 -0.02 
CD490k_3 -84,208.8* 43,471.8 -1.94 
CD900k_3 -9,735.4 46,367.3 -0.21 
CD990k_3 -49,089.7 42,676.7 -1.15 
D100k_3 142,967.4*** 36,902.0 3.87 
D500k_3 187,663.3*** 42,597.0 4.41 
Dmill_3 304,493.9*** 54,500.8 5.59 
Value_Evaluation 0.8*** 0.0 81.48 
Livingarea 422.5 378.1 1.12 
Build_Year -125.3 220.7 -0.57 
Actual_Sale_Year 15,949.1*** 4,772.4 3.34 
Actual_Sale_Month -19,720.4*** 2,284.7 -8.63 
Apartment -246,291.7*** 29,882.6 -8.24 
RowHouse -114,368.6*** 24,346.0 -4.70 
SemiDetached -32,586.5 25,725.2 -1.27 
Alna -170,261.9** 66,171.2 -2.57 
Bjerke -46,526.9 43,238.3 -1.08 
Frogner 107,518.6** 44,919.3 2.39 
Gamle_Oslo 149,465.3*** 55,865.1 2.68 
Grorud -187,180.5** 86,742.2 -2.16 
Grünerløkka 202,116.3** 79,413.6 2.55 
Nordre_Aker 235,503.3*** 37,524.3 6.28 
Nordstrand -30,961.4 36,184.4 -0.86 
Sagene 227,082.1*** 56,003.6 4.05 
Sentrum 82,856.6 211,452.0 0.39 
St_Hanshaugen 149,503.8*** 49,403.6 3.03 
Stovner -261,023.6*** 58,104.6 -4.49 
Søndre_Nordstrand -332,880.2*** 50,822.1 -6.55 
Ullern 47,030.0 39,697.7 1.18 
Vestre_Aker -11,190.2 37,206.7 -0.30 
_cons -30,528,552.6*** 9,678,285.1 -3.15 
F statistic 930.44   
R-squared 0.91   
N 9,086   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Robust standard errors are the Huber/White-estimators of  variance 
 
Dxxxk_1: Salesprice ≤ 3 000 000 kr Dxxxk_2: 3 000 000 kr < Salesprice ≤ 5 000 000 kr Dxxxk_3: 5 000 000 kr < Salesprice 
The results of the regressions are quite remarkable, as only the CD900k charm listing price dummy 
in price group 2, and the CD50k for price group 1 and 2 is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. At a 10% significance level we find that CD900k in group 1 and CD490k in group 3 are 
significant, although the latter in fact has a negative(!) coefficient. This is a quite stark indication 
that the hypothesis of charm listing prices having a positive effect on the final sales prices, should 
be rejected in most cases. None of the above results change when the standard errors are re-
calculated using the HC3 heteroskedasticity-correction, providing some additional robustness to the 
results.  
 The round numbers listing prices that were included as a check, actually turn out positive 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% level, across all the 3 price groups. This is the 
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exact opposite of what Allen and Dare (2004) find in their data for the American market. Also, the 
absolute values of the estimated coefficients for the round number dummies increase dramatically 
from group 1, via group 2, to group 3. On average, the estimated effect of using one of the three 
round number listing price designs in price group 3 is at least 4-5 times larger than in group 1. It 
thus seems as the effects are relative to the price level of the dwelling in question, and that the effect 
is increasing in the level of the dwellings market worth. 
As mentioned earlier, the 50k dummy can be interpreted in multiple ways. Some may not agree that 
50 000kr should be interpreted as a charm price. To some extent I agree with this view. Firstly, in 
the low price segment it is not uncommon for value evaluations to end with 50 000kr. Actually, in 
57% of the instances where the asking price ends in 50 000kr, the asking price is also identical to 
the value evaluation. That means that only 43% of the time the 50k charm dummy is plausibly 
interpreted as a charm price. Thus, the finding that the 50k charm dummy has a positive and 
significant effect on the final sales price in price group 1 and 2, cannot solely be attributed to its 
function as a charm price.  
 Another notable finding is that the coefficient of the charm price CD900k_2 is not statistically 
significantly different from the coefficient of Dmill_2. Therefore, if we assume that the choice is 
between setting an asking price either at the million marker  or at a 900k marker, then the effect on 
final sale price is indistinguishable betwen the two options. 
Two issues needs to be addressed; firstly Allen and Dare (2004) include data on the different real 
estate agencies, which are involved in the transactions. They follow the Heckman two-step 
procedure to control for the potential effect of self-selection. The reason for this is that the broker 
may have knowledge of which dwelling is more likely to experience a positive effect of a charm 
asking price than others, and thus the dwellings we observe in the sample that use a charm asking 
price, are the ones more likely to have a positive effect. As I do not have any data on the real estate 
agencies involved in the transactions, a correction for this cannot be undertaken. However, if 
anything, the coefficients on the charm listing price dummies should then be biased upwards. As for 
the most part they are found to be not statistically significant, this selectivity effect is not likely to 
drive the results.  
One could also suggest that, there is a possibility that some of the sellers (or their real estate agents) 
know that it is the round numbers listing price strategy that pays off in the market. If that is the case, 
then a correction for this selection bias should be conducted as the estimated coefficients then 
would be inflated upwards for the round number listing prices. Alas, since data on this is not 
available this procedure cannot be done for this sample. 
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The second issue with the specification is the lack of a measure that captures the effect of a 
prolonged marketing time on sales price. This requires an estimation of a proportional hazard rate 
model (usually Weibull or Cox type of specification), as the time on market is simultaneously 
determined along with the sales price. The dataset which is being used in this analysis only contains 
observations of actual transaction and not those that withdrew from the market. Any model 
estimating time on market would need to take account of this censoring. The results from an attempt 
to construct such a model shows that the property characteristics can only explain 4% of the 
variation in the time on market durations. To use the predictions of such a model to control for the 
expected time on market in the charm regressions is likely to induce a lot of noise, and is thus not 
included. 
However, a different regression specification is constructed in order to check the robustness of the 
charm listing price regressions. It might be plausible that the effect on final sales price from the 
chosen listing price design is related to the degree of “underpricing”, as measured by the difference 
of asking price from value-evaluation. Therefore I construct a specification in which I include a 
dummy equal to 1 if asking price = value evaluation (“askonval”). This will in most cases pick up 
the same effect as the round number dummies did in the previous specification, as value evaluations 
tend to be on round numbers.  
Dummies are also constructed for the most common listing price designs, found in Table 5, which 
all have a listing price lower than the value evaluation. For most transactions this will pick up a 
similar effect to that of the charm listing price dummies, found in Tables 8 through 10. These 
“underpricing” dummies are included in a separate regression specification, as we do not want to 
include both these and the “askonval” because what we are effectively comparing against is then the 
handful of remaining observations that do not have either charm pricing or round number pricing. 
This is thus another check to see if what we found in Tables 8 through 10 was driven by the chosen 
specification, which compares the round number pricing and charm pricing against (the minority) of 
all other pricing strategies. Separating the two specifications allows us to more directly compare the 
effect of round number pricing versus charm pricing.   
Tables 11 and 12 display the results from the two following regression specifications, which are 
estimated for the 3 different price groups separately:  
Salesprice = β(Askonval, Value Evaluation, Dwelling’s Physical Characteristics, 
Time Trend,  City Borough Dummies) 
(3) 
This specification is designed to pick up the effect of no under-pricing, i.e. asking price equals 
value evaluation. 
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The opposing regression is designed to specifically pick up the effect of “under-pricing”, i.e. asking 
price is below value evaluation:  
Salesprice = β(Most Common Under-Pricing Dummies , Value Evaluation, 
Dwelling’s Physical Characteristics, Time Trend, City Borough Dummies) 
(4) 
I follow Allen and Dare (2004) and use standard errors calculated with the HC3. As shown by 
MacKinnon (2012) it is a good correction for heteroskedasticity, most notably in small samples. 
The present sample size is quite large, so it should not make a world of a difference. However, the 
idea is that it at least will be a stricter measure, and leads to rejections more often since the test 
statistic has much thicker tails than the standard normal distribution. 
Table 11: No-Underpricing Regression Group 1-3 
Sales Price                       Coefficient            HC3 Standard Error        t       n 
Askonval_1 57,445.3*** 2,131.8 26.95 27,032 
Askonval_2 105,923.6*** 4,569.2 23.18 15,740 
Askonval_3 344,190.5*** 14,799.4 23.26 9,086 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 12: Underpricing Regression Group 1-3 
Sales Price                  Coefficient              HC3 Standard Error          t 
underP10k_1 24,436.2*** 2,958.7 8.26 
underP50k_1 -13,356.5*** 4,305.4 -3.10 
underP60k_1 660.6 3,295.4 0.20 
underP100k_1 -62,274.6*** 6,439.2 -9.67 
underP110k_1 -16,698.9*** 3,870.6 -4.31 
underP150k_1 -105,844.1*** 8,785.8 -12.05 
underP200k_1 -164,422.1*** 14,238.5 -11.55 
underP210k_1 -111,044.9*** 8,014.7 -13.86 
underP10k_2 32,981.0*** 6,660.8 4.95 
underP50k_2 13,959.1 9,954.4 1.40 
underP60k_2 3,436.7 9,776.6 0.35 
underP100k_2 -16,107.7 14,267.0 -1.13 
underP110k_2 -20,804.4*** 6,823.5 -3.05 
underP150k_2 -53,197.6*** 13,843.4 -3.84 
underP200k_2 -121,359.7*** 18,566.4 -6.54 
underP210k_2 -87,025.2*** 10,391.5 -8.37 
underP10k_3 65,209.4*** 21,783.8 2.99 
underP50k_3 42,738.3 28,823.9 1.48 
underP60k_3 46,110.4 89,426.8 0.52 
underP100k_3 62,282.9 40,290.0 1.55 
underP110k_3 -21,579.1 21,336.2 -1.01 
underP150k_3 -102,468.4*** 36,171.9 -2.83 
underP200k_3 22.3 60,556.4 0.00 
underP210k_3 -11,722.8 28,592.9 -0.41 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Only coefficients of the variables of interest are included, control variables are omitted for brevity. 
Summary Statistics for Group 1, 2 & 3 are represented in Table 13. 
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Underpricing and No-Underpricing Regressions 
       Underpricing regression             Askonval regression 
    
 F statistic 5,453.31 7,193.31 
Group 1 R-squared 0.88 0.88 
 Number of Observations 27,032 27,032 
    
    
 F statistic 808.59 1,135.58 
Group 2 R-squared 0.75 0.76 
 Number of Observations 15,740 15,740 
    
    
 F statistic 909.91 1,205.15 
Group 3 R-squared 0.91 0.92 
 Number of Observations 9,086 9,086 
The results clearly indicate that those dwellings were the asking price is equal to value evaluation 
sell for more, on average, across all the three different market segments. As an example, take the 
coefficient of Askonval_1 in table 11. This dummy variable indicates that the dwelling had an 
asking price equal to value evaluation. Its coefficient is 57 455 kr, indicating that it is predicted to 
sell for more than an object with the same value evaluation that was priced below value valuation. 
Similarly in Table 12 we find that the dummies for underpricing are mostly negative, where the 
reference category in that specification is the dwellings were asking price was equal to value 
evaluation.  
The specifications controls for value evaluation as a measure of the dwellings quality, thus the 
“askonval” and underpricing dummies should pick up the extra effect, not the variations in value 
evaluations and dwelling-quality as such. Again, we see estimated coefficients that are in a similar 
range to those found for the round numbers listing prices in table 8-10. And furthermore, it seems 
like the premium for setting an asking price equal to value evaluation is increasing as we move 
from a low price segment to the highest priced market segment. 
The underpricing regression results further backs up the finding that a charm listing price strategy 
does not pay off in the marketplace. We find mostly that the estimated coefficients are strongly 
statistically significant and negative. The exception here is the strategy of underpricing by 10 000kr, 
which is estimated to have a positive effect on final sales price that varies in the range of 24 436 kr 
to 65 209 kr, for the lowest price and the highest price segment respectively. The standard errors for 
the estimated coefficients are increasing  from group 1 through 3, so any confidence interval of the 
point effect would be increasingly wide for the different market segments. 
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It can be pointed out that the estimated negative effects of underpricing, are always smaller than the 
magnitude of underpricing itself. For instance, the underpricing of 150 000kr below value 
evaluation always has a coefficient which is of a lesser magnitude than 150 000kr, thus even though 
the underpricing is strong, the effect on final sales price is smaller than the initial underpricing. 
Also, the effect of underpricing does not follow the same pattern we found in the round numbers 
listing price-effect, which was increasing as we moved from the low price market segment, to the 
high price market segment. 
When constructing a continuous variable for underpricing, which is simply the difference of asking 
price-value to evaluation, and rerunning the regression for the three different market segments, we 
find that the effect of underpricing varies from .81 to .93, and is significant at the 1% level. 
Meaning that, again the underpricing has a negative estimated effect on the final sales price. Per 
krone of underpricing ,the estimated coefficient on final sales price is a reduction of 81 to 93 cents 
(øre). Under a causal interpretation this would imply that it is not only the most common 
underpricing strategies that have a negative effect on final sales price, but possibly all of the 
underpricing strategies more in general. 
To summarize the main findings; 
The results point in the direction of a positive effect of a round number listing price design, where 
in most cases the asking price is set equal to the value evaluation. The effects of a charm listing 
price design are for the most part not statistically significant across the three different market 
segments, although some exceptions are found. The effect of underpricing is estimated to have a 
(strong) negative effect on the final sales price. 
The reason as to why so many make use of a charm listing price design and underpricing if it does 
not have any positive impact on the final sales price, is not clear at this point. Part of the effect we 
have found might be due to unobservable characteristics, although using the value evaluation as a 
control for this largely eliminates that sort of error. It is possible, although purely speculation at this 
point, that people hold false beliefs and think that the charm listing price design will attract more 
buyers and thus are likely to bid up prices. Perhaps it is also a reflection of the fact that real estate 
agents have incentives to sell dwellings faster than what might be optimal for the owner, thus 
wanting to set a lower asking price to increase the possibility of a match in the market (Levitt & 
Syverson, 2008). There could be a number of reasons for the observed effects of the listing price 
design, and both rational and behavioral interpretations are likely to contribute with further 
knowledge on this particular  issue. 
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3.3 Sales Price: Clustering at Round Numbers 
An interesting aspect of the distributions of prices in the housing market reveals that there is a 
considerable amount of clustering in the sample. This means that there is an unusual high amount of 
dwellings being transacted at certain price points, more than what we would expect if prices were 
drawn at random from a smooth probability distribution. The best way to represent this is by a 
graphical analysis, where the distributions of prices are displayed in histograms. To be able to 
detect the effects of round number pricing and charm pricing, all prices are rounded down to be 
placed in a 10 000kr bin. In this way, the 3 million kr bin contains all prices from 3 000 000 to 
3 009 999, and so on and so forth.  
As shown in 1.3.1, the value evaluations have a strong tendency to cluster at round numbers; prices 
ending with 50 000’s, 100 000’s and million markers have a much higher transaction count than 
other prices. However, from 1.3.2 it is clear that, when we look at asking prices the tendency of the 
distribution is to cluster at charm-prices ending with 90 000kr. That is, 10 000kr below any hundred 
thousand or million marker. 
Both of those prices are indicators of a dwellings market value, and carry significant information to 
the potential buyer, but ultimately it is the final transaction price that really matters. So how will the 
two opposing forces of round numbers bias and charm pricing, affect the final market outcome?  
A measure of the excess mass at round numbers is represented by the spikes in the distribution of 
sales prices found in Figure 11. The histogram gives us an indicator of the overall distribution of the 
data, although it is difficult to see exactly which price points are responsible for the spikes. 
When we take a closer look in Figure 11, at the range of sales price between 2 and 3 million kr, we 
can clearly see that it is the round numbers that are responsible for the spikes. Figure 12 shows that 
those price points are transacted far more often than the surrounding prices. If we assume a random 
draw from a smooth probability distribution as a benchmark for the underlying distribution of 
prices, we see that no choice of such a distribution can explain the systematic occurrence of high 
transaction counts at round numbers.  
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Figure 11 - Distribution of Sales Prices 
 
Figure 12 - Sales Prices Clustering at Round Numbers 
Over the course of the 8 years for which we have data, the percentage of dwellings that sold for 
more than their asking price was 63%. This reflects the fact that it has been a seller’s market, where 
demand for housing is large. However, 29% of dwellings ended up with a sales price below asking 
price. 
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The frequency of dwellings which had sales price equal to asking price was 8%. And the dwellings 
that ended up with a final sales price equal to the value evaluation made up 8,5% of the sample. 
This might indicate that the relative strength of the two price anchors; asking prices as charm 
pricing and value evaluations as round numbers, are possibly quite similar in the magnitude in 
which they affect the final transaction price. 
We should also note that the distribution of sales prices is more evenly distributed, when compared 
to those of asking prices and value evaluations, as there is more mass in the bins surrounding the 
round numbers and the charm-prices. Thus, it seems as if the market partly corrects for some of the 
round numbers bias evident from value evaluations, and some of the charm pricing bias from asking 
prices. The final sales price distribution is thus a bit smoother than the distribution of value 
evaluations and asking prices.  
Still, the remaining clustering of sales prices at round numbers cannot readily be explained by a 
story where value evaluations are round numbers biased and buyers simply pay the value 
evaluation. Nor does the data fit a description in which the buyers simply pay the asking price stated 
by the seller. Therefore, we will now look further in to how the negotiation process itself can be an 
explanatory factor for the observed clustering. 
The following analysis will rely on the empirical approach found in Pope et al. (2014), from here on 
referred to as (PPS). 
3.3.1 Round Numbers Regression Analysis 
In order to quantify the effects of round numbers, and test for statistical significance I follow PPS’ 
outline for a regression design. Firstly, the sample is now restricted to those dwellings whose final 
sales price lands exactly on a price which is cleanly divisible with 5 000kr. This amounts to 99,6% 
of the dwellings in the total sample, and allows for calculation of positive sales volumes for each of 
those discrete price points. Furthermore, I also restrict the sample to dwellings whose final sales 
price was above 1 075 000kr and below 10 100 001kr, in an attempt to eliminate the effect of 
outliers. This also simplifies the estimation of the 7
th
-degree polynomial in sales price, which is 
constructed to account for a smooth underlying distribution of the sales count found in each 5 000kr 
price bin. This leaves us with 50 655 out of the 51 858 observations in the initial dataset (98% of 
the sample).  
I adopt PPS’ notation (Pope et al., 2014) and the following regression specification is run: 
            𝑄𝑗 =  𝜃𝐹
7(𝑝𝑗) + 𝛽1𝑋𝑗
 50𝑘 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑗
 100𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑗
 500𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗
  𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙 + 𝜀𝑗 (5) 
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The dependent variable  𝑄𝑗 denotes the total number of sales observed at the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ price point, as 
measured in 5 000kr increments. So that 𝑄1000 is the price point of 5 000 000kr. The first term in 
equation (5) is a 7
th
-order fractional polynomial of sales price which captures the overall 
distribution of sales volumes. More details on the estimation of this polynomial is found in 
Appendix D. The idea is that this kind of smoothing can account for the underlying distribution of 
sales counts across the various ranges of sales prices. In Figure 13 we see the result of the fractional 
polynomial plotted against the actual observed transaction count.  
 
Figure 13 – Fractional Polynomial of Salesprice Which Smoothes the Sales Count Distribution 
The four 𝑋𝑗 terms are indicator variables for prices divisible exactly by 50 000kr 100 000kr, 
500 000kr and 1 million kr: 
- The 50k dummy is equal to 1 for any sales price ending exactly on any 50 000kr marker: 50 000, 100 000, 
150 000  10 000 000  
- The 100k dummy is equal to 1 for any sales price ending exactly on any 100 000kr marker: 100 000, 200 000, 
10 000 000 
- The 500k dummy is equal to 1 for any sales price ending exactly with: 500 000, 1 million,  10 million 
- The “mill” dummy is equal to one for any price ending exactly on any million price point: 1 million, 2 million, 
 10 million  
These indicators are now additive in such a way that a price of 3 000 000kr will have a value of 1 
for each of the four indicator terms, as it is cleanly divisible by each of those round numbers. A 
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price of 9 500 000 will have indicators equal to 1 only for 𝑋𝑗
 50𝑘, 𝑋𝑗
 100𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑗
 500𝑘 . A price of 
5 300 000 will only have an indicator equal to 1 for the 𝑋𝑗
 50𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑗
 100𝑘 variables. A price of 
1 850 000 will only have an indicator equal to 1 for the 𝑋𝑗
 50𝑘 variable. Thus, it should be clear that 
the interpretation of the dummies are different to those found in the regressions of section 3.2.2, as 
those were mutually exclusive dummies, and the specification just described in this section have 
additive dummies. 
Therefore, the estimated regression coefficient 𝛽1 is the extra sales volume found at 50 000kr 
thresholds, relative to other 5 000kr price points. In similar fashion the marginal effect on sales 
volumes at 100k price points is given by 𝛽1 + 𝛽2. The 500k- and million kr thresholds are given by 
𝛽1 + 𝛽2+𝛽3 and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2+𝛽3+𝛽4,  respectively. 
Table 14 - Round Numbers Effect on Sales Count 
Number of Sales Coefficients 
          (I)                       (II) 
SD50k 246.747***  
(0.616) 
 248.56*** 
(0.62) 
SD100k 85.252*** 
 (0.638) 
 81.12*** 
(0.65) 
SD500k 31.291*** 
 (1.211) 
 31.50*** 
(1.20) 
SDmill 14.143*** 
 (1.604) 
 13.72*** 
(1.59) 
Above SDmill  
 
 -27.74*** 
(1.23) 
Below SDmill   -18.95*** 
(1.20) 
 
    
Seventh order 
polynomial in sales 
price 
                                                                                
Yes 
                                    
Yes 
 
F statistic 42,590.89  40,609.49 
Adj. R-squared 0.90  0.91 
N 
 
50,655  50,655 
Number of 5 000 kr 
price bins in 
estimation 
 
000000000000  1477  00000000 1236 
Mean sales count at 
other non-focal (5k) 
price poins 
51  51 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01     Standard errors in parenthesis  
 
 
To get a sense of how large the effects of the round number focal points are, it is useful to note that 
the mean sales count at non-focal prices was 51 sales. 
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From specification I we can tell that the lowest of the round number focal point dummies, where 
prices are divisible by 50 000kr, has a sales volume almost 5 times larger than other 5 000kr price 
points. Pope, Pope and Sydnor (2014) suggest that their lowest round number focal point dummy 
($5k) represent both some degree of convenience rounding and the effect of the focal point. It is 
reasonable to believe that the 50 000kr divisible prices reflect the same two factors in the 
Norwegian market. There is another 85 extra sales estimated to be in each of the 100 000kr divisible 
focal points, and the half million and million round numbers also contribute to a greater sales 
volume than those prices which are exempt a focal point.  The additional effect of those two focal 
points was 31 and 14 added sales, respectively. 
So even if we allow for some degree of convenience rounding, essentially hypothesizing that 
market participants are using a pricing grid that mostly consist of 50 000kr intervals, we still 
observe that the focal points of 100k, 500k and million markers attract a substantial mass of excess 
sales. 
We can summarize the results using the 50k focal point as a benchmark. The effects we find are that 
100k focal points have a sales count which are more than 29% larger than other 50k price points 
( 
51+246+84
51+246
 ). The 500k focal points have a 39% larger sales volume than other 50k focal points, 
and the million marker focal points attract a mass of sales which is 44% larger relative to other 50k 
focal points. Although the findings here are not directly comparable to those in PPS’ analysis, due 
to currency conversion and choice of focal points, the relative increase in sales found in the Oslo 
data do seem to be similar to those found in the American market. PPS report an increase in sales 
count for $25k divisible focal prices that are 24% higher and a 44% increase for $50k divisible 
focal points, both compared to other $5k divisible price points. 
In regression specification II of Table 14, I have added indicators for dwellings where the sales 
price is 20 000kr to 70 000kr above a million-kr focal point. E.g. dwellings with a sales price in the 
range of 4 020 000 to 4 070 000kr have the indicator “Above SDmill” equal to 1. In similar fashion 
I construct an indicator variable; “Below SDmill” for those dwellings with sales prices 20 000kr to 
70 000kr below a million-kr focal point. The reason for designing the dummies in such a way, is to 
avoid picking up the effect of charm asking prices, in those cases where buyers simply pay the 
asking price. As shown earlier in section 2.2, the occurrence of charm pricing was approx. 65% of 
all transactions, and 8% had sales price equal to asking price, thus roughly 5% of the sample simply 
paid the charm asking price. 
From column II, also in Table 14, we see that the coefficients on the focal points are similar to those 
found in column I, and all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. We see that both the “Above 
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SDmill” and “Below SDmill” are negative, reflecting that the million-kr focal point attracts mass 
from both sides. It indicates that some dwellings which have a market worth just above a million-kr 
focal point, are actually instead being sold at the very salient focal point, thus selling for less than it 
would if the focal point was absent. Similarly, it suggests that some dwellings which have a market 
worth just below a million-kr focal point, are actually ending up selling at the focal point instead. In 
this case it is thus selling for more than it would if the focal point was absent.  
We can thus say that the million-kr focal point pulls sales mass both from above and below, and we 
note that the pull is stronger from above than from below, with a ratio of (Above/Below) = 1,46. I 
follow PPS and interpret a ratio above unity as reflecting that more mass of sales is being pulled 
from the seller’s side. A ratio below unity indicates the opposite, namely that more mass of sales is 
being pulled from the buyer’s side of the price distribution. 
3.3.2 Heterogeneity Over Time 
As the housing market tend to be cyclical, and there are variations in price growth across the years 
covered in the data, I would like to assess if there is any substantial heterogeneity in the effect of 
focal points across time. 
Figure 13 displays the estimated ratio of sales volumes for the million-kr focal price compared to; 
all the 5k price bins contained in the sample and the 50k-, 100k- & 500k-focal prices. The estimated 
ratios are from a regression identical to that found in Table 14, column I, which now is conducted 
for each year in the sample separately. Full regression results are omitted for the sake of brevity.  
 
Figure 14 – Estimated Million-kr Focal Price Pull of Mass Ratios 
We see that compared to the mean sales count of all prices found in the data sample, the effect of 
the million-kr focal point has been increasing over time. 
1
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However, when compared to the other focal prices in the sample, the effect of the million-kr focal 
price has marginally decreased. The flat or even marginally decreasing effect of the million-kr focal 
point is different to the findings of PPS, where they estimate that the $50k focal price to $5k focal 
price-ratio is increasing over the years of 1998 to 2008, and peaks at a ratio of 2 in 2007. In the 
Oslo data the effect of the million-kr focal point compared to the effect of the 500k focal point was 
at parity in 2012. However, the relative stable ratios which are consistently above 1 suggest that the 
million-kr focal point in general has a stronger effect on sales than any other focal point. 
3.3.3 Pull of Mass from Seller or Buyer? 
In the regression specification of Table 14, column II we found that there was an asymmetry in the 
effect of the million-kr focal point, as it pulled more mass from above than below. To see if there is 
any variation in the effect of pull of mass over time, a regression specification identical to the one 
found in Table 14- column II, is conducted for every year in the period 2006-2013. Full regression 
results are again omitted for brevity.  
The regression coefficients for “Above SDmill” and “Below SDmill” are used to calculate the ratio 
of pull of mass at the million-kr focal points. As the Oslo housing market both experienced rapid 
price growth, a small downturn and then accelerating growth again in this period of time, it should 
be useful to see if the effect of the focal points varies across time. In Figure 14 we see the ratio of 
the sales count pulled from 20 000kr to 70 000kr above versus below a million-kr focal point, 
plotted out across the years 2006-2013. 
All the regression coefficients for both the “above”- and “below”-indicators were negative, 
reflecting that the million-kr focal points attract excess mass from the surrounding price points for 
all years included in the sample. The pull of mass is consistently higher from above the million-kr 
focal points, than it is from below. Thus, the ratio of the two is always greater than unity for the 
entire sample. 
As Figure 15 shows, the pull ratio is for the most part stable in an interval between 1,4 to 1,7, 
however we see a notable peak in 2012, and low points in 2006 and 2013. 
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Figure 15 – Heterogeneity of Mass of Sales Above/Below Million-kr Focal Points Across Time 
The mean ratio across all the years in the sample is 1,46, implying that the million-kr focal point on 
average pulls 46% more mass of sales from the seller’s side of the price distribution. Of course, we 
can only speculate as to why sellers are potentially accepting a lower sales price than what would 
have been if the focal point was absent. Pope et al. (2014) offer a potential explanation, which is 
that sellers already believe they are getting a good return on the dwelling, and are accepting because 
of considerations of fairness or other social norms. Thus, applying insights from the theory of 
fairness by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in the housing market could be a future research agenda, see 
Schein (2002) for an apt example of this. 
Perhaps surprisingly we do not find, as PPS does, that the ratio falls below 1 during the financial 
crisis year of 2008. The Norwegian house price index fell from Q1 2007 to Q3 2009, but this is not 
reflected in the pull of mass ratio. However, as the house price index again fell from Q1 2013 to Q3 
2013 we see that this is accompanied by a sharp drop in the ratio of mass pulled from the sellers 
side. The direction of the shifts in pull of mass seems to be a conundrum, as standard economic 
theory would suggest that sellers are pressed in a downturn market, and thus accept lower price. On 
the contrary, the ratio of pull of mass above/below the million kr threshold seems to decrease when 
sales prices are decreasing. In that regard, it points towards more mass being pulled from the 
buyer’s side in a downturn market. Even though this seems to be an interesting aspect to investigate 
further, we must keep in mind that the short data sample only allows us to find correlations and not 
causation. In fact, it might be a spurious link altogether. In the absence of a longer and richer data 
set, we can only speculate as to what the specific mechanism driving the pull of mass ratio is.  
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Heterogeniety of Excess Pull of Sales Mass Across Time: 
A ratio above (below) 1 in the graph implies that the drop is larger (smaller) above the focal 
price than below.  
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Mean ratio of
pull across all
years in
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4 Conclusion and Remarks 
From the literature overview in the first section, we have seen that the occurrence of behavioral 
biases is well documented in the literature. As an example, loss aversion has empirically been found 
to affect real estate markets in different parts of the world, and is also demonstrated in many 
experimental settings. This indicates robustness of the phenomenon across dimensions of time and 
space. The economic effects are substantial and do not vanish when exposed to market forces, or 
when agents are more experienced. 
Price expectations are a key component to the housing market, and are empirically difficult to 
assess. Expectations can potentially drive markets away from “fundamentals”, especially if market 
participants are prone to herding behavior. The user cost of housing framework adopts an asset-
market approach to the housing market, however, using this model as a baseline to assess house 
prices might be problematic as heterogeneity, and limits to arbitrage are key institutional features of 
housing markets. In a low interest rate environment, the price expectations can dominate in the 
calculations of the user cost yielding negative prices, and the theory becomes undefined. An 
alternative approach was analyzed (N. Barberis et al., 1998), where the housing market is described 
in relation to investor sentiment, allowing for both overreactions and underreactions to the events 
occurring in the marketplace. Indications of sentiment in both the U.S. and Norwegian housing 
markets were offered. 
The possible behavioral influence of prices on market participants is at the heart of this thesis. The 
effects of different asking price strategies, as found in the literature, are multi-faceted and pull in 
opposite directions. Some reports find that round numbers listing price have a positive effect on 
final sales price (Palmon et al., 2004), while others indicate that charm asking prices translates into 
higher final sales prices (Allen & Dare, 2004).  
In the empirical part of this thesis, I have exploited the rich nature of the dataset and analyzed the 
interlinkages between value evaluation, asking price and final sales prices. I find that: 
 Value evaluations are good predictors of final sales price, but on average they tend to be 
lower than final sales price. Some characteristics of the dwellings are not sufficiently 
incorporated into the estimates of market worth. The surveyors cluster their value 
evaluations at round numbers. 
 
 Asking prices cluster at charm prices, that is “just-below” a round number. As a whole, I 
find very few indications that a charm listing price design has a positive impact on final 
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sales prices. However, a round number listing price design does have a positive effect on the 
final sales price, and the magnitude is increasing as we move from the low price segment to 
the high price segment of the market. As a check of this (surprising) result, I show that 
dwellings which have an asking price equal to value evaluation, consistently obtain a higher 
final sales price than other listing price strategies. The dwellings that are “under-priced” 
(having an asking price which is lower than the value evaluation), sell for comparatively 
less. These findings are consistent across all the three market segments. 
 
 Final sales prices cluster at round numbers. The regression analysis, which accounts for the 
underlying distribution of the sales count through a 7
th
 order polynomial, estimates that 100 
000kr-, 500 000kr-, and million kroner-focal points all attract extra mass of sales, as 
compared to other 50 000kr price points in the distribution. All the results are significant at 
the 1% level. The million kroner focal point has the strongest effect on the sales count, and 
is estimated to attract 44% more sales than other 50 000kr price points. The data indicate 
that the relative strengths of the different focal points seem to be stable across the years of 
2006 to 2013. Furthermore, the pull of mass at the million kroner focal point comes from 
both above and below in the price distribution, however the pull of mass is always greater 
from above than from below. This is interpreted as a pull of mass from the seller´s side of 
the distribution, which is a conundrum in a booming market. 
The reason as to why all the prices in the sample tend to cluster, either at round numbers or at 
charm prices, is still not clear. And why do the round number asking prices obtain a premium in the 
market, when they are compared to charm asking prices? One behavioral interpretation of the 
results could be that the search behavior of buyers is focused on market segments. If a buyer 
searches for an apartment in the price range of 1 850 000 to 2 million, and another buyer searches 
for a dwelling in the range of 2 million to 2.3 million, then only the round number asking price of 2 
million will appear in both searches. In this way, the round number asking prices might attract more 
buyers, perhaps due to the salience of that number. 
However, the level of detail in the data does not allow for testing of those kinds of hypotheses. In 
the end, both rational interpretations, and behavioral interpretations of these findings are likely to 
contribute to further knowledge of how the housing markets truly function. It is my conjecture that 
our discipline will benefit from such a pluralistic approach. 
 
Nota bene; 
Change is the only constant in economics. (Curtin, 2007, p. 34) 
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Appendix A 
 
Additional Behavioral Biases with Implications for the Housing Market 
 
Money Illusion 
It has commonly been noted in the literature that loss aversion occurs in nominal terms. That is to 
say, people assess values in nominal terms, the reference point is often a nominal term, and the loss 
aversion is therefore not in relation to real prices. In relation to housing markets,Genesove and 
Mayer (2001) test for both nominal and real loss aversion, and find significance only for nominal 
loss aversion. Engelhardt (2003) concurs with this view, testing for both versions of loss aversion in 
his data set spanning 149 metropolitan areas of the U.S., concluding that only nominal loss aversion 
is significant. This is an interesting finding, and can be seen as the conjunction of two behavioral 
biases, namely money illusion and loss aversion. With this in mind, a brief overview of money 
illusion is warranted to understand how these two biases interact. 
At least since Fisher (1929) published “The Money Illusion” the economic literature has been awash 
with research on the fallacy people often commit when assessing values, especially when long term 
comparisons are undertaken. Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) attribute money illusion to 
cognitive processes and the salience of nominal values. “People attend to nominal value because it 
is salient, easy to gauge, and in many cases provides a reasonable estimate of real worth.”(Shafir 
et al., 1997). The authors demonstrate how money illusion is found in a variety of populations and 
in different contexts, such as contracts, law and trading. One of the survey experiments presented in 
the paper ask respondents to rank three hypothetical cases of selling a house. One case with nominal 
loss in which prices has declined 25%, but the selling price is only 23% lower, yielding a 2% profit 
in real terms. The second in which there is no inflation, and the selling price is 1% lower than initial 
purchase price, yielding 1% real loss. The third case is a nominal gain with 25% inflation and a 
selling price 23% higher than purchase price, yielding 2% real loss. It turns out that 48% of 
respondents thought the last option with a real loss of 2% was the best choice. 53% ranked the real 
gain of 2% as the worst option.  Respondents systematically identified the non-inflationary case as 
the second-best outcome, but chose nominal over real gains when deciding their first-best option.  
“Loss aversion occurs relative to a reference point, and the reference point can often be nominal, 
yielding further manifestation of money illusion.”(Shafir et al., 1997).  
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In regard to loss aversion, Stephens and Tyran (2012) show in their experiment that money illusion 
interacts with loss aversion and constitutes nominal loss aversion for subjects’ evaluation of house 
prices. Their incredibly rich dataset also allows them to evaluate personal traits that are correlated 
with nominal loss aversion. It turns out that cognitive reflection tests carry more explanatory weight 
than standard intelligence tests and education levels. It is suggested that the ability engage in re-
thinking of first intuitions is what matters the most if nominal loss aversion is to be avoided. Ackert, 
Church, and Jayaraman (2011) pursue a similar survey experiment approach and finds significance 
of money illusion when considering house-prices. The two surveys complement each other. 
Interestingly Ackert, Church and Jayaraman find that although respondents suffer from money 
illusion, their price expectations are for future house prices are not too far from actual observed 
price change. The average estimate is conservative in the short run (1 year) and possibly 
overestimates the price growth in the medium run (5 years), which is similar to the findings of K. E. 
Case et al. (2012). Interestingly, they find no link between money illusion and loss aversion, which 
contradicts the findings of many others. This might be stemming from the nature of their dataset, 
which is less extensive and it is thus harder to elicit such detailed correlations.  
The Disposition Effect 
In behavioral finance, loss aversion is commonly referred to as one component of the disposition 
effect. The disposition effect is in essence the sum of investors’ reluctance to realize losses and their 
inclination to sell winners. Shefrin and Statman (1985) documented the effect nearly 30 years ago, 
and Odean (1998) found evidence for the disposition effect in real-world stock transactions. A more 
recent paper tests the disposition effect in a formal theoretical framework with simulations, and 
discovers that prospect theory is a good explanation when preferences are defined over realized 
gains and losses (N. Barberis & Xiong, 2009). However, when investor preferences are defined over 
annual gains and losses, the model often predicts the opposite of the endowment effect; sell loosers 
and hold on to winners. The difference in time perspective, and more crucially, the timing of when 
the agent receives utility is therefore essential for the model they construct. The authors argue that 
the annual gain/loss-model is closer to standard models found in finance, but the realized 
gains/losses-model is a more compatible interpretation of prospect theory. The latter model 
specification allows for a distinction between paper losses and realized losses, which seem to have a 
substantial effect since this specification more readily produce results that are coherent with 
prospect theory. Mental accounting might be an explanation for the difference of the two 
specifications results, as investors narrowly frame investments, and only experience gain/losses 
when those mental accounts are closed through sales. 
72 
 
The predictions of prospect theory and those pertaining to the disposition effect in particular are 
somewhat easier to test in the context of pure financial markets. Firstly, they are traded publicly 
with stringent requirements to information and disclosure which generates a lot of data. The 
availability of broad datasets make it easier to test for the disposition effect, relative to other less 
transparent markets. It is valuable to focus on the part of the disposition effect that arises from the 
part of selling winners to early, as this is perhaps what distinguishes the disposition effect from loss 
aversion and the endowment effect. More on the endowment effect in the section below. 
As Barberis & Xiong (2009) note, and Grinblatt and Han (2005) also argue; the common procedure 
in the literature is to assume prospect theory in conjuction with mental accounting as the 
explanation of the disposition effect. 
 
The Endowment effect 
In Novemsky and Kahneman (2005, p. 119) the disposition effect is implicitly defined as loss 
aversion occurring in a riskless context. The common setup for empirical enquiry is an experimental 
setting where half of the participants get a coffee-mug, chocolate bar or similar item of low value. 
The other half of the subject population get money to trade with. Participants can then freely trade 
(or refuse to do so) between them. Economic theory predicts that the randomized allocation of 
coffe-mugs and money should lead to about 50% of the mugs being traded on average. However the 
reoccurring finding across studies is that those who get an endowment (coffe-mug/chocolate bar) 
tend to require, on average, a much higher price to part with their endowment than what prospective 
buyers are willing to pay. This gap in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) compared to the willingness-to-
accept (WTA) is what has been labeled; the endowment effect.  Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) 
entertains the possibility that loss aversion can be seen both as a description and explanation of the 
endowment effect.  
Richard Thaler (1980) was the first to offer prospect theory, and loss aversion in particular, as an 
explanation for the endowment effect (a term he coined). The endowment effect can be viewed as 
another incarnation of loss aversion. Agents need to exhibit loss aversion behavior in order for the 
endowment effect to materialize. The key point seems to be that you are given an object or even a 
prospect of such, and by the power vested in the act of receiving and owning something, you put a 
premium on that object. This leads to the endowment effect in which subjects are unwilling to part 
with their endowment, unless the price premium is granted. As numerous studies show, this leads to 
a consistent and significant discrepancy in the willingness-to-pay for an item and the willingness-to-
accept for the same item. See Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) for an overview. It is this 
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asymmetry, which constitutes the endowment effect. Given that agents do not exhibit loss-averse 
behavior, the endowment effect would then fail to materialize. As such, loss aversion can possibly 
be interpreted as a necessary condition for the endowment effect. 
Chapman (1998) provide some insights into the effect the similarity of traded items has on the 
endowment effect. Some evidence indicates that loss aversion is declining in the similarity of traded 
objects. The explanation offered for this is that similar object will be interpreted as less of a loss 
than very dissimilar ones. This is in accordance with prospect theory’s predictions. This insight can 
be applied to the real-estate market. In the case of the housing market, most sellers are also buyers. 
Shortly before or after they sell their house they will tend to buy a new one, given that the need for 
housing services has not changed (death, transfer to rental market etc.). Taking the findings of 
Chapman and applying them to the housing market can thus possibly explain the magnitude of loss 
aversion. If sellers perceive the market as very heterogeneous, then loss aversion is expected to be 
strong. If the market is perceived as very homogenous then loss aversion is expected to be weak. 
This highlights the findings of Karl E. Case and Shiller (1988) that people tend to think of their 
home as having some intrinsic worth because their dwelling is seen as something special. 
This claim can be further supported by the evidence that ownership history affects the evaluation of 
objects (Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998). It is demonstrated that the ownership period of an 
object, in our case a house, increases the valuation of the said object. As holding periods for homes 
can potentially be rather long, we can be expected to believe that this contributes to and propagates 
the findings of loss aversion in the market for homes. 
Nash and Rosenthal (2014) elaborates on the findings by Strahilevitz and Loewenstein and finds 
that indeed the duration of ownership is an explanatory factor for the magnitude of the observed 
endowment effect. In a lottery over college housing the results yields substantial findings of the 
endowment effect, and it increases over time as participants actually live in their allotted rooms. 
Conducted through a real allocation of college dorm rooms at Stonehill College in Massachusetts, 
the experimenters asked the WTA for giving up their first-choice residence hall from those that had 
already been granted their first choice through the lottery. WTP for their first-choice option was 
asked of those who did not get their first-choice granted through the lottery. The results were a 
significantly larger threshold for the WTA compared to the WTP. Together, this supports the 
hypothesis of an endowment effect in relation to housing. 
A follow up was conducted when the participants had been living in their residence halls for 2 
months. The results were that the WTA had increased, meaning a higher compensation was required 
to forfeit their first-choice residence hall. The WTP was not statistically different from the initial 
74 
 
treatment. The authors argue that this exemplifies the fact that loss aversion and the endowment 
effect still matters for real outcomes, and when the stakes are high (compared to chocolate bars and 
mugs). It also shows an increasing tendency of a stronger endowment effect over time as 
participants experienced life in their respective residence halls. However, the survey design of the 
study cannot be expected to fully mitigate the considerations of social aspects; such as living with 
friends, even though it was set up to eliminate influences like these. 
 
Herding Behavior 
“Herding in financial markets generates speculative bubbles when traders are tracking the decision 
of others, not the fundamental value of assets” (Baddeley, 2013, p. 214) 
While the quote above is targeting financial markets explicitly, there is mounting evidence that this 
kind of behavior also occurs in housing markets (Baddeley, 2005; Hott, 2012; Lan & Lan, 2014). It 
should also be noted that the housing market constitutes a major part of households financial 
wealth, and therefore can be thought of as inherently capturing aspects of a financial market. 
Buying a house is one of the most critical financial decisions over the lifecycle of a household, and 
given the general level of financial savviness of the population, it can be a difficult decision to 
make. 
There are different types of herding behavior emphasized in the literature. There can be herding 
behavior based on assumptions of rationality. That is, agents extract valuable information through 
the observation of others and incorporates this information into their own decision (Hung & Plott, 
2001). This is called Bayesian herding and the effect of this behavior is considered an information 
cascade, in which useful information ripples through to the decision-maker. Hung and Plott (2001) 
also show that the institutional setting in which decisions are made, greatly affects the herding 
behavior of individuals. 
 The contrarian view differ in the way it underlines the non-rational cause of herding to be social 
influences and “group thinking”. The representativeness heuristic, in which people calculate 
probabilities based on the ease with which different scenarios come to mind, may be a proponent of 
herd behavior. It also seems to be intimately linked with the theories of market sentiment, in which 
speculative bubbles arise because beliefs about other’s beliefs are that the asset will continue to 
appreciate. Baddeley (2013, p. 214) argues that social learning theories and herding behavior can be 
traced back to John Maynard Keynes, and stresses the argument that rational herding on the 
individual level aggregates to irrational “speculative frenzies” on the macroeconomic level. This 
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can be explained by a herding externality, which leads to inefficient outcomes in the aggregate 
(Banerjee, 1992) 
Hott (2012) show that a model of herding behavior can explain a significant amount of the excess 
volatility in housing prices across 10 OECD countries, see Figure A.1 for an illustration of his 
results . Using a rational model of user costs of housing, and what he calls “the market view” (GDP, 
population growth, mortgage rates and construction activities are determinants of house prices) as a 
benchmark, he shows that house prices are excessively volatile across all the 10 countries in his 
sample. The volatility is of a magnitude which the fundamentals cannot adequately explain. 
Furthermore, Hott show that a heuristic decision rule where households deviate from the user cost 
of housing rational decision-making, and focus instead on current income and current supply of 
housing can explain more than the pure rational model of actual observed housing prices. In the 
end, Hott finds that a herding model where agents follow market sentiment, bidding up prices when 
recent market trends are better than expected, and vice versa when the opposite is true, is the best fit 
to actual observed housing prices. He finds that herding behavior is evident in all of the 10 
countries, and that the herding model improves the MSE of the regressions by 20% on average.  
 
Figure A.1 – House Prices (Herding, Fundamental and Actual) in Sweden and the United States, (Hott, 2012, p. 193) 
Even though research such as the one outlined above explains more of the excess volatility in 
housing prices than the user cost of housing model, there is still a lot of variation in prices left 
unaccounted for. Hott proposes that banks’ lending behavior could be one missing variable in this 
case. Herding behavior can also possibly affects banks at a systemic level, as discussed in Acharya 
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and Yorulmazer (2008), and might further explain the excess volatility in the housing markets. 
However, at this point the literature is not conclusive at the time of writing. 
 
 
Markets, Experience and Mitigation of Behavioral Biases 
A common conjecture within the traditional literature is that biases are attenuated, or even fully 
mitigated by experience. In the world of finance, which is mostly dominated by professionals with 
years of experience, it has been documented that there is a propensity to sell winning stocks too 
early and hold on to losing stocks too long (Odean, 1998), as noted in the Disposition Effect section 
above. Crane and Hartzel (2010) also find that professionals managing real estate funds suffer from 
the disposition effect, and that this cannot be explained by any alternative explanations such as tax 
incentives, mean-reversion or asymmetric-information.  
When it comes to loss aversion, Genesove and Mayer (2001) find that experience only attenuates 
approximately half of the loss aversion effect, while Bokhari and Geltner (2011) only evaluate 
professionals and actually find that more experienced property investors, as measured by number of 
trades, exhibit a higher degree of loss aversion. A cautious interpretation would be that experience 
and “professionalism” do not eliminate the effects of behavioral biases completely.     
Another example comes from Kvaløy (2015), who has run through the numbers for the 2007-2013 
yearly forecast-award (Samfunnsøkonomenes “Prognoseprisen”) conducted by the economics labor 
association in Norway. He wanted to investigate if “luck” is being recognized as “skill”, as Daniel 
Kahneman (2011a)  has argued occurs frequently, and usually in industries which are human capital 
intensive. The premise here is that if the forecasters had measurable skills in the discipline of 
forecasting, then one would expect to find correlation of the performance on a year-to-year basis. In 
the data Kvaløy analyzed, he finds an average correlation of 0,09 for the 10 forcasting companies 
which are represented. This could suggest that “skill” is attributed to “luck” when it comes to 
forcasting.  
Kahnemans original analysis was done on stock-market returns data, in which he investigated the 
correlation across time for stock-market funds and managers, and he found a correlation barely 
different from zero. The conclusion Kahneman drew was that picking an actively managed 
investment fund based on past performance was, on average, not significantly different from rolling 
a dice and letting the throw decide which fund to choose. Kvaløy did the same testing for 
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Norwegian investment funds over the years 2009 to 2014 and found, again, that correlation was 
0,01 ~ virtually like throwing a dice! 
These might be cases of over-optimism, or other deviations from rationality, but nevertheless they 
are congruent across time and space, and are therefore likely to be robust in many areas of decision-
making. Professional forecasters do put in a lot of effort, and to the best of their ability produce 
forecasts that are grounded in well-established theory. The conclusion we perhaps can draw is not 
that the forecasters do not know what they are doing, but rather that forecasting economic variables 
over longer time spans is an incredibly difficult task! 
 
The failure amongst experts to recognize the finding that, despite all their efforts, their predictions 
are no better than the throw of a dice, is perhaps what is most puzzling? 
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Appendix B 
 
A Current Estimate of the User Cost of Housing in Norway 
I adopt the notation from Himmelberg et al. (2005) 
 
1) 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 =  𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑓 + 𝑃𝑡𝜔𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝜏𝑡(𝑟𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜔𝑡) + 𝑃𝑡𝛿𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝑔𝑡+1 + 𝑃𝑡𝛾𝑡 
Price of housing: 𝑃𝑡  Risk-free interest rate: 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑓
 Property tax rate: 𝜔𝑡  Income tax rate: 𝜏𝑡 
Mortgage interest rate: 𝑟𝑡
𝑚 Maintenance costs: 𝛿𝑡 Risk premium of owning: 𝛾𝑡   Expected capital gain: 𝑔𝑡+1  
 
It is assumed that: 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 =  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 because of the asset-market 
approach where rental market is treated as a perfect substitute for owner-occupiers. It thus follows;
  
2)     𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝑢𝑡    
Where 𝑢𝑡 is the right hand side of equation 1, with 𝑃𝑡 factored out, and 𝑅𝑡 the annual rental cost. 
Thus the common relationship between price of owning and price of renting is: 
3)    
𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑡
=
1
𝑢𝑡
 
Thus if we follow Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai’s (2005) approach and adjust their numbers to the 
current Norwegian market; 
 We can use the current Norges Bank key policy rate, unchanged as from 12.12.2014 as risk-
free rate: 1,25% 
 The property tax rate is by and large 0% for most households 
 Income tax rate in the range of 40% 
 Mortgage interest rate 3% (Statistics Norway, 2015c) 
 Maintenance cost 2,5% (as in (Himmelberg et al., 2005)) 
 Risk premium: currently the market is pricing the risk, measured as the difference of the 
mortgage interest rate from the risk-free rate = 1,75% , a more conservative approach can be 
2% as in (Himmelberg et al., 2005)  
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 Capital gains: 7.2% which was national average past year or 18% which was national 
average over past 10 years, both calculated with the house price index (Statistics Norway, 
2015a)).  
Or 39,39% national average (1970-2003) from (Eitrheim & Erlandsen, 2004, p. 365). 
 
We get a user cost which equates to:  
0,0125 − (0,4 ∗ 0,03) + 0,025 − 0,072 + 0,02 =  −0,0265 
This is the most conservative specification. If the longer series of national averages is employed as 
measure of expected capital gains, the cost goes deeper into negative territory. As noted in section 
1.4.1 Himmelberg et al. (2005) suggest that the user cost is undefined when it crosses the zero lower 
bound. An alternative interpretation can be that the risk premium in the Norwegian market at this 
point in time must be extremely large, in order for the user cost equation to balance. 
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Appendix C 
The Quality of Data & Size of The Sample 
Eiendomsverdi AS, is a subsidiary of four of the largest banking constellations in Norway, and 
those banking constellations also have a large market involvement through subsidiary real estate 
agencies (DNB Eiendom, Privatmegleren (Nordea) and Eiendomsmegler 1 (Sparebank1)). 
Therefore, the database is constructed partly by the input of real estate agents. Eiendomsverdi AS 
also collaborates with FINN Eiendom AS (the largest internet marketplace for real estate in 
Norway) and Real Estate Norway (the national association for Norwegian realtor brokerages), 
ensuring that the dataset covers all real estate agencies active in Oslo. 
The close collaboration with real estate agents (more than 90% of agents participate according to 
Eiendomsverdi AS), entails that the database is swiftly updated the day after a sale is made, and 
later matched against official records and registry data to ensure the quality of the record. However, 
as some data is typed by hand, the data may have some erroneous entries. Furthermore, the 
collaboration with FINN Eiendom (which is the largest online listing service by any measure) 
indicates that the total database of Eiendomsverdi comprise almost 92% of all residential 
transactions in Norway (RealEstateNorway, 2015).  
The data for my analysis come from the same source as Statistics Norway use to construct their 
housing price index, so the quality of the data should be adequate for this study. However as 
Statistics Norway also note: “The sample covers about 60 per cent of all dwelling-sales on the open 
market. Systematic skewness is still possible in the sample, regarding housing standard and 
location.” (Statistics Norway, 2015a).  
The dataset I have acquired is thus a subset of that sample, and to pinpoint exactly how large the 
share of the transactions included in the sample is out of the total in Oslo is a difficult task. All I can 
offer is a qualified guess.   
Real Estate Norway claims that their data covers 92% of all housing transactions in Norway, 
Statistics Norway says about 60%. As my dataset is a subsample of theirs, a conservative estimate 
would then be somewhere in the middle of those two stated ranges, with perhaps a greater weight 
put on Statistics Norway’s estimate (They are, after all, the official statistical entity in Norway, 
which should give them an advantage in matters like these). 
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The Norwegian Housing Market 
In Figure C.1, we see the Norwegian house price index from 1995 to 2012, in comparison with a 
selection of other OECD-countries.  
 
Figure C.1 - (Norges Bank, 2013)  - Housing Prices in Selected Countries, Indexed. Q1 1995 = 100. Quarterly,  Q1 
1995- Q4 2012. Data Source: Thomson Reuters 
In general, we see an upwards sloping trend with a clear downturn around the years of the financial 
crisis. Remarkably, Norwegian house prices quickly recovered and reverted to the previous pattern 
of rapid growth. Surrounding countries followed a more sideways development post-2008, with 
prices levelling off. In Spain and Netherlands prices continued to decline notably. 
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Geographical Summary Statistics 
 
Figure C.2 – Distribution of Transactions by Borough 
 
An overview of the geographical or spatial variance in the dataset is displayed in Figure C.2. We 
see that the central boroughs of Frogner, Grünerløkka, St. Hanshaugen and Sagene  are responsible 
for almost 50% of all the transactions observed in the data. In Statistics Norway’s database over 
dwellings in Oslo we find that those four boroughs contain 36% of all dwellings in Oslo. Thus, we 
can infer that those four boroughs is overrepresented in the datasample, as dwellings in the central 
area of Oslo tend to transact more often than others. The oversampling, as compared to when each 
dwelling can transact only once, is 38%. 
More interestingly we see systematic differences in price levels for the different boroughs, 
reflecting both the variation in sizes and types of dwellings located in the boroughs.  
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Figure C.3 – m2-Price by Borough, Oslo 2006-2014 mean. 
Additionally, in Figure C.3, it may be reasonable to interpret some of the difference in price as an 
expression of the perceived level of housing service quality provided by the different boroughs (be 
it proximity to public transport, nearby attractions such as shops, cafés, or schools and recreational 
spaces). We see that the total sample mean is quite high due to the fact that it is the high priced 
central boroughs that contain the most transactions. 
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
The dataset is comprised of 65 969 housing transactions the last 9 years in the Oslo municipality 
area. There are 31 variables included in the raw dataset, ranging from geographical indicators, 
property characteristics, dwelling characteristics, time variables and price characteristics of the 
transactions. However some variables have a lot of missing entries (“Rent” is entirely missing, 
“RenovatedYear”, “Rooms”, “Floor”, and “LoanValuation” all have missing values affecting the 
range from 20% to 95% of the observations. The core variables in the dataset, defined as variables 
without any missing values, are: “RegDate”, “Salesprice”, “Price”, “SqmPrice”, “LivingArea”, 
“EstateType”, “Ownership”, “SiteType”. In addition, geographical indicators that tie the 
observations to Oslo municipality are included for every observation. Variables where less than 5% 
of observations are missing; “AskingPrice”, “Bedrooms”, “Postcode”, “CityDistrict” and 
“BuildYear”. Salesprice and Price are the same, thus Price is dropped. 
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Variable Lists 
Table C.1: Price Variables 
*As defined by Norwegian Valuers and Surveyors Association; Tilstandsrapport – en veiledning om begreper, ord og 
uttrykk (www.ntf.no/new/download/brosjyrer/tilstandbrosjyre.doc) 
  
Name of variable 
 
 
 Note Observed mean in 
the data N=51858 
SD in parenthesis 
Salesprice “Salgspris” Is the specified amount transferred from buyer 
to seller. 
3.546.295 
(2.131.987) 
Asking Price “Prisantydning” Is the asking price posted by sellers 3.433.484 
(2.146.418) 
 
 
Valuevaluation 
 
“Verditakst” 
 
Is the assessed market value conducted by a 
professional valuer/surveyor*. 
 
3.505.722 
(2.197.129) 
loanvaluation  “Låneverdi” Is a conservative estimate of market value, 
made by real estate agent or professional 
surveyor, which is thought to give the creditor 
sufficiently security for the mortgage given*. 
Is often assumed to be 80-90% of the 
valuevaluation. In the data the mean loan 
valuation is 85% of the value valuation. 
 
3.149.864 
(1.997.212) 
N=34031 
Sqmprice = Price per square meter 
of living area 
 The ratio of:  
 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
 
 
42.558 
(12.572) 
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Table C.2: Physical Attributes of Dwelling 
Name of variable  Observed mean in the 
data N=51858 
Livingarea           = “Primære rom (P-rom*)” 
 
88,78m
2 
(53,11) 
Utilityfloorspace  = “Bruksareal (BRA*)”     
 
93,29 m
2 
(61,15) 
N=46172 
Grossarea       = “Brutto areal (BTA*)”    
 
103,84 m
2 
(68,12) 
N=48711 
Floor              The floor on which the dwelling is located 
 
2,84 
(8,15) 
N=41628   
rooms Number of rooms in the dwelling 
 
2,67 
(1,22) 
N=2630 
bedrooms Number of bedrooms in the dwelling 
 
2,15 
(1,11) 
N=49663   
renovatedyear Year of renovation 
 
2004,16     
(7,16) 
N=6381      
buildyear,  Year of construction 
 
1955,61   
(39,64) 
sitearea Total area of the property-lot for the entire 
estate/entire building for multi-dwelling 
complexes 
 
4758,95    (18148,37) 
N=48372 
estatetype Type of dwelling: 
Apartment, Detached house, Semi-Detached 
house or Row-house 
(see separate table of summary) 
 
 
ownership Ownership status of dwelling. 
 
The data only contains self-owned properties 
(Selveier), not stock-option apartments or co-
operative apartments (borettslag).   
 
 
sitetype Leased or owned type of estate 
 
 
* As defined by Norwegian Valuers and Surveyors Association; Area, measurement and definitions 
(http://www.ntf.no/page1323637.aspx) 
  
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table C.3: Time Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.4: Geographical Indicators  
 
Regdate 
 
Time of registry in the market 
 
Actualsaledate 
 
Actual date of transaction 
 
 
Publicregistrationdate 
Date of public registry, when the 
transaction is processed by official 
government agency. Usually some 
months after actual sale date.  
code00 Postal code 
Name Oslo 
Citydistrict Specifying the city borough in which the dwelling resides. 
Councilnumber 301 
Councilname Oslo 
Countynumber 3 
Countyname Oslo 
City Boroughs Note 
Alna  
Bjerke  
Frogner  
Gamle Oslo  
Grorud  
Grünerløkka  
Marka To be excluded due to  
mostly containing recreational dwellings and not primary dwellings 
Nordre Aker  
Nordstrand  
Sagene   
Sentrum   
St.Hanshaugen   
Stovner   
Søndre Nordstrand   
Ullern   
Vestre Aker   
Østensjø   
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Appendix D 
 
Estimation of a 7
th
 Degree Fractional Polynomial to Control for the Underlying 
Distribution of Sales  
Statacommand: 
  fp <salesprice>, dimension(7) replace: regress COUNT2 <salesprice>  
 estat ic 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     7.76e+07    9322054     8.33   0.000     5.93e+07    9.59e+07
salesprice_7     .0056684   .0007566     7.49   0.000     .0041854    .0071515
salesprice_6    -316.6025   39.21792    -8.07   0.000      -393.47    -239.735
salesprice_5     250800.4    30116.6     8.33   0.000     191771.5    309829.2
salesprice_4     -8629094    1035845    -8.33   0.000    -1.07e+07    -6598828
salesprice_3    -1.26e+09   1.56e+08    -8.08   0.000    -1.57e+09   -9.56e+08
salesprice_2     1.17e+10   1.47e+09     7.97   0.000     8.84e+09    1.46e+10
salesprice_1    -2.63e+11   3.60e+10    -7.31   0.000    -3.34e+11   -1.93e+11
                                                                              
      COUNT2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.5112e+09 51655  29254.9896           Root MSE      =  152.01
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2102
    Residual    1.1934e+09 51648  23105.5904           R-squared     =  0.2103
       Model     317808956     7  45401279.4           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7, 51648) = 1964.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   51656
(*) P = sig. level of model with m = 7 based on F with 51642 denominator dof.
                                                                               
       m = 7     13  665616.08    152.005       0.00       --   -1 -.5 -.5 0 0 .5 1
       m = 6     11  665646.57    152.049      30.49    0.000   -.5 0 .5 1 1 1
       m = 5      8  665684.24    152.103      68.16    0.000   -.5 0 0 0 0 
       m = 4      8  665783.86    152.248     167.78    0.000   -1 -1 -.5 -.5
       m = 3      6  666366.07    153.107     749.99    0.000   0 0 .5      
       m = 2      4  667188.82    154.329    1572.74    0.000   -1 -.5      
       m = 1      2  673256.75    163.664    7640.68    0.000   1           
      linear      1  673256.75    163.664    7640.68    0.000   1           
     omitted      0  677812.63    171.041   12196.55    0.000               
                                                                               
  salesprice     df    Deviance  Res. s.d.   Dev. dif.   P(*)   Powers
                                                                               
Fractional polynomial comparisons:
                                                                             
           .    51656   -338906.3     -332808      7     665630.1      665692
                                                                             
       Model      Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC
                                                                             
Akaike's information criterion and Bayesian information criterion
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